Risk analysis of industrial plant submitted to major accident due to natural events by Pozzi, Beatrice
  
 
 
UNIVERSITÀ DEGLI STUDI DI PADOVA 
DIPARTIMENTO DI INGEGNERIA INDUSTRIALE 
CORSO DI LAUREA IN INGEGNERIA CHIMICA E DEI PROCESSI INDUSTRIALI 
 
 
 
Tesi di Laurea Magistrale in  
Ingegneria Chimica e dei Processi Industriali 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Risk analysis of industrial plant submitted to 
major accident due to natural events 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Relatore: Prof. Ing. Giuseppe Maschio 
Correlatore: Ing. Chiara Vianello 
 
 
 
 
Laureanda: BEATRICE POZZI 
 
 
 
ANNO ACCADEMICO 2016 – 2017 
   
  
Riassunto 
Lo scopo di questo elaborato è quello di proporre un metodo che permetta il calcolo del 
rischio di incidenti rilevanti indotti da eventi naturali in impianti fissi. L’analisi del rischio 
convenzionale non è sufficiente per adempiere questo compito. Per questo motivo si sono 
utilizzati due metodi alternativi, che sono stati applicati in due diverse località: Porto 
Marghera (VE), in cui c’è la sede della bio-raffineria di Eni, e Priolo Gargallo (SR). La scelta 
è stata dettata dalle diverse caratteristiche territoriali delle due aree, in modo da poter fare 
dei confronti. 
Partendo dall’albero dei guasti di un serbatoio di stoccaggio di green diesel dell’impianto 
Eni di Porto Marghera, si è applicato il metodo DyPASI. Tale tecnica è costituita da 5 fasi: 
la fase 0 consente di effettuare il “punto della situazione” realizzando il bow-tie; la fase 1 
richiede  la  raccolta di informazioni attraverso motori di ricerca contenenti dati su incidenti 
o mancati  incidenti e, per valutare se tali informazioni possono essere coerenti con il 
contesto in cui opera l’impianto, è effettuata un’analisi sulla vulnerabilità del territorio; la 
fase 2 consente di fare una lista di priorità degli eventi raccolti durante la fase precedente 
affinché si possa valutare se sia effettivamente necessario per esse condurre un’ulteriore 
analisi; la fase 3 è l’identificazione effettiva degli scenari atipici; la fase 4 è l’identificazione 
delle barriere di sicurezza. 
L’applicazione della DyPASI ha consentito di identificare nuove cause e nuovi scenari per 
il top-event su cui lo studio si è focalizzato, dimostrando in tal modo i vantaggi 
dell’integrazione di questa tecnica innovativa con le tecniche convenzionali. 
Una volta ottenuto il bow-tie aggiornato, si è passati al calcolo della frequenza di rottura del 
top-event. A questo punto si è dovuto scegliere se usare un approccio deterministico o 
probabilistico. Avendo a che fare anche con frequenze di rottura a causa di terremoti, si è 
preferito l’approccio probabilistico. Si sono quindi dovute convertire le frequenze di rottura 
dei componenti meccanici mediante l’utilizzo di una funzione esponenziale. In questo modo 
è possibile ottenere le distribuzioni di probabilità di guasto per l’apparato meccanico 
coinvolto, grazie all’uso di un programma di calcolo. Allo stesso modo sono state ottenute 
le distribuzioni di probabilità di guasto dovute a piogge violente. 
Questi dati sono, dunque, compatibili con quelli che è possibile ottenere dall’analisi sismica: 
attraverso la matrice di distribuzione dei terremoti, al vettore frequenza e alle curve di 
fragilità dei materiali si ottiene la probabilità di guasto legata all’evento sismico. 
I contributi dovuti ad eventi naturali vengono sommati e quindi moltiplicati al contributo 
dovuto al guasto dell’apparato meccanico così da ottenere un dato generale, che tenga conto 
di tutte le possibili origini del rischio (meccaniche e naturali) in ottemperanza alla “Direttiva 
Seveso III”. 
Risultati diversi si ottengono nelle due zone: dall’analisi di vulnerabilità infatti emerge che 
l’area di Porto Marghera è soggetta ad inondazioni ed è una zona a basso rischio sismico, 
sebbene sia da prestare attenzione sul fatto che sia circondata da zone sismiche (Friuli, 
Emilia). D’altra parte Priolo Gargallo è un’area ad elevato rischio sismico. Per cui gli alberi 
dei guasti e le relative frequenze saranno differenti. Inoltre, i calcoli sono stati fatti sia nel 
caso di serbatoi ancorati che non ancorati e i risultati ottenuti evidenziano che per le zone 
sismiche si debbano prendere in considerazione sistemi di isolamento sismico. 
  
  
Abstract 
The aim of this study is to develop a methodology that allow the calculation of the risk of 
relevant accident due to natural events in industrial plants. Conventional risk assessment is 
insufficient to perform this work. For this reason, two new methodologies are used and they 
have been applied in two different locations: Porto Marghera (VE) and Priolo Gargallo (SR). 
These choices are not casual, they have different territorial characteristics. 
DyPASI is the first approach to be used, it’s composed of five steps and at the end of the 
analysis the new bow-tie is obtained and it considers also natural events. From the 
vulnerability analysis of the two locations, the result is that Porto Marghera is affected by 
heavy rainfall and earthquakes, while Priolo Gargallo is a highly seismic area. 
The next step is the calculation of the failure frequency of the top-event. First of all, it is 
decided to use the probabilistic approach; mechanical failure frequency and heavy rainfall 
failure frequency are converted in probabilistic failure distribution by means of exponential 
function. 
In this way, these data are compatible with the ones that is possible to obtain performing a 
seismic analysis: through the matrix of distribution of earthquakes, the frequency vector and 
the fragility curves of the equipment it is possible to obtain the probability of failure due to 
earthquakes. The global result is obtained summing the contributions of natural events and 
then multiplying them with the mechanical contribution. 
Thus, all possible sources of risk (due to mechanical failure and natural events) are taken 
into account in compliance with the "Seveso III Directive". 
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Introduction 
Nowadays, the risk assessment of chemical plants is considered a key parameter in terms of 
investment opportunity. In particular, safety perception in public opinion is an important factor 
that can determine the acceptance of a plant by surrounding inhabitants. 
In addition, climate changes caused an increasing frequency of severe natural events and the 
damage of process equipment due to the impact of natural events is known to have triggered a 
number of severe accidents in the chemical and process industry due to the loss of containment 
of hazardous substances. 
For these reasons, it’s important to carry out a risk analysis, which is the result of a multi-
disciplinary investigation, in order to consider also natural events. 
Thus, conventional risk analysis is left out and two new methods are considered: DyPASI 
technique is used to develop the qualitative risk assessment, while for the quantitative risk 
assessment the probabilistic fault tree analysis is performed. 
 
This thesis is composed of six chapters. 
In Chapter 1, natural disasters, such as earthquakes and floods, are described and it’s discussed 
how it is possible to evaluate seismic and flooding risk for a chemical equipment.  
Also the regulatory framework is briefly discussed in Chapter 1 (concerning safety in chemical 
plants), in particular Seveso Directive and its modification are described. In 2012, the “Seveso 
III Directive” was promulgated and it considers, for the first time, domino effect due to natural 
events such as flooding and earthquakes. Seismic events are a characteristic of Italy: in fact, 
there are several seismic areas and almost all the peninsula is submitted to this risk. In addition, 
in recent years, some regions of Italy are characterized by radicalization of the clime, especially 
due to heavy rainfalls. 
Chapter 2 deals with conventional risk assessment procedure: the first step is the Hazard 
Identification, which can be carried out with several approaches, that can be qualitative, or 
semi-quantitative. Among the qualitative approaches there are historical analysis of incidents 
and accidents, check lists and the “what if” analysis; while semi-quantitative approaches are: 
HazOp (Hazard and Operability study), FMEA (Failure Mode and Effect Analysis) and 
FMECA (Failure Mode, Effect and Criticality Analysis). Then the quantitative hazard analysis, 
with the fault and event tree, is described. 
In Chapter 3 limitations of the classical risk analysis are highlighted and then DyPASI technique 
and probabilistic fault tree are introduced as solutions to cope with these limits. 
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In Chapter 4, the locations of case studies are described. In fact, location can determine the final 
value of the risk analysis. It’s carried out the vulnerability analysis of the two locations and then 
it’s applied the DyPASI technique in order to obtain the updated bow-tie. 
In Chapter 5 it’s described the procedure used to develop the fault tree analysis and it’s also 
explained the numeric code applied. 
Chapter 6 shows the results of risk analysis obtained using the procedure described in Chapter 
5. Simulations are performed for anchored and unanchored tank, thus it’s possible to compare 
conclusive results and make some considerations. 
The methodology used in this work allows to give a first try in risk analysis as the “Seveso III 
Directive” asks. 
  
Chapter 1 
Interaction between natural events and 
industrial structures 
Natural disasters, such as earthquakes and floods, can impact industrial installations that 
process or store hazardous materials, potentially causing major accidents with fires, explosions 
or toxic releases.  
A literature analysis has shown that none of the European countries have specific risk and 
emergency management programs in place which contemplate explicitly the occurrence of 
natural disaster interacting with industrial installations. 
On the other hand, ‘Seveso Directive III’ in 2012 emphasized preparation of emergency plans, 
involving the public in consultation and decision making and including identification and 
accidental risks analysis and prevention methods also for natural causes, such as earthquakes 
and floods. To deal with these procedures a multi-disciplinary effort is needed. 
1.1 Natural-Technological accidents 
Natural catastrophic events may affect the integrity of industrial structures (equipment, 
auxiliary system, instrumentation, structural support, utilities). Therefore, loss of energy or 
mass or, more generally, both mass and energy from the containment system is likely to occur.  
If industrial facilities store large amount of hazardous materials, accidental scenarios as fire, 
explosion, or toxic dispersion may be triggered, thus possibly involving working people within 
the installation and/or population living in the close surrounding or in the urban area where the 
industrial installation is located. Accidents of this type are commonly referred to as Natural-
Technological (Na-tech) accidents. 
To consider every possible external event, that is an event whose cause is external to all systems 
used in normal operation, a diligent study of geologic, seismologic, hydrologic, and 
meteorological characteristics of the site region as well as present and designed industrial 
activities near the plant should be conducted. An example of list of natural external events is 
shown in Table 1.1. Each external event has to be reviewed to judge whether it deserves further 
studies. 
The knowledge of the plant and its design basis are used to screen out from the list all the 
hazards that, reasonably, have a negligible contribution to risk of the plant. 
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Table 1.1. List of natural external events 
 
Seismic activity Intense precipitation 
Coastal erosion Low winter temperature 
External flooding External winds and tornadoes 
Fire River diversion 
Sandstorm Fog 
Forest fire Snow 
Frost Hail 
Soil shrink-swell consolidation High summer consolidation 
Hurricane Storm surge 
Ice cover Tsunami 
Internal flooding Landslide 
Volcanic activity Lightning 
High lake or river water level Waves 
 
A particular hazard can be screened out if: 
• The event has a damage potential equal or lower than the specific events for which the 
plan has been designed. This required an evaluation of plant design bases in order to 
estimate performance against a specific external event. This screening criterion is not 
applicable to events like earthquakes, floods, and extreme winds since their hazard 
intensities could conceivably exceed the plant design bases.  
• The event has a significantly lower mean frequency of occurrence than other events 
with similar uncertainties and could not result in worse consequences than those events. 
• The hazard cannot take place close enough to the plant.  
• The event is included in the definition or consequences of other events. For example, 
storm surge is included in external flooding. 
1.2 Earthquakes 
The interaction between earthquakes and industrial equipment can result in extensive damage 
when hazardous processes are involved (Na-Tech risks). Consequently, industrial risk 
assessment should consider the consequences and the likelihood of occurrence of accidental 
scenarios triggered by such natural events. To this regard, it is worth noting that Na-Tech 
procedures need multi-disciplinary effort: definition of probability of occurrence of earthquake 
intensity (i.e. Probabilistic Seismic Hazard Analysis or PSHA), structural analysis of equipment 
under seismic actions, forecast of specific response of industrial processes due to the given 
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structural damage of equipment, are indeed all necessary steps to be added to the classical 
methodologies for the re-composition of industrial risks. 
However, this is not the unique available option. An interesting approach to Na-Tech risk 
mitigation is represented by seismic early warning systems (EWS); EWS is a set of actions that 
can be taken from the moment when a seismic event is detected with significant reliability to 
the moment the earthquake strikes in a given location. 
1.2.1 Earthquake characterization and prediction 
In order to understand how to mitigate and to cope with earthquakes, it’s important to know 
how they “work”. Ground motions are generated by seismic waves radiating from the 
earthquake focus to the site. Their intensities have to be related to the earthquake source, to the 
path for the seismic waves from the source to site, and to the specific geomorphologic 
characteristics of the site where the Na-Tech is performed. Many random features of 
earthquakes, including energy, frequency contents, and phases affect the actions applied to the 
structures and thus their structural response. 
Earthquake signals carry several uncertainties and it is not even a trivial task to define a 
univocally determined “intensity” of earthquake, thus allowing comparison of records. 
However, geophysicists and structural engineers use to classify earthquakes based on two 
classes of parameters such as “ground parameters” and “structural dynamic affecting factors”. 
The choice of these intensity parameters is important since they summarise all the random 
features of earthquakes. 
Ground parameters refer to the intensity measures (IM) characterising the ground motion: PGA 
or alternatively peak ground velocity (PGV) and response spectra (RS) at the site location of 
the component. 
Structural affecting factors usually refer to the dynamic amplification induced on a single 
degree of freedom system with the same period of the analysed structure (first mode spectral 
acceleration), although experimental investigations have shown that different parameters are 
needed if the effects of earthquake on structures would be accurately reproduced by structural 
analysis. For instance, in seismic analysis of piping system PGV is commonly used, whereas 
PGA is more useful when steel storage tanks are under investigation. 
Currently, the problem of definition of effective and reliable predictors for inelastic seismic 
behaviour of structures is one of the main topics of earthquake engineering. However, empirical 
vulnerability analyses are often carried out in terms of peak ground acceleration, mainly 
because it is relatively easy to infer by earthquake intensity conversion. Furthermore, extensive 
historical databases on structural damages are usually defined by PGA; and transformation from 
typical earthquake magnitude (e.g. Modified Mercalli or Richter scale) to this variable is 
generally accepted. 
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For the aims of early warning system, additional information is useful on the time of arrival of 
seismic wave from the focus point. In the framework of industrial risk analysis only two types 
are of primary interest: P (primary) waves, which travel faster and are the first to be recorded, 
and S (secondary) waves, that together with other type of waves (surface waves) produce most 
of damages and destruction. P waves can travel through any medium, whereas S waves can 
only travel through solids. Surface waves are slower than P and S waves and can only travel on 
the surface of the earth. 
The speed of a seismic wave is not constant but is dependent upon many factors. Speed changes 
mostly with depth and rock type. P waves travel between 6 and 13 km/s. S waves are slower 
and travel between 3.5 and 7.5 km/s. Hence, the distance of seismic recording station to the 
earthquake epicentre can be known by using the times of travel of the S and P waves. 
Figure 1.1 shows the time of arrival of seismic P and S waves, and their time difference, for 
any location at distance from focus point. 
Data reported in Figure 1.1 can be usefully adopted for early warning issues. In fact, several 
seconds may elapse between the arrival of the first P wave at the monitoring station and the 
arrival of the damaging S and surface waves and this time interval increases with the distance 
from the focus of the earthquake. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.1. Time of arrival of seismic waves with respect to distance of earthquake focus 
point. ---: S waves; ——: P waves; – · –: (S–P) waves. 
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1.3 Fragility analysis for industrial equipment 
Behaviour of structures and components under load induced by external hazard event, like 
earthquakes, is relevant and must be assessed to evaluate probabilities of faults and 
malfunctioning. This process is based generally on structural analysis and relates intensity 
measures of a given loads to effects on the structures. However, typical industrial accidental 
scenarios in the process industry (explosion, fire, toxic dispersion) depend basically on the total 
amount of released dangerous substances. 
Accordingly, seismic vulnerability of equipment should be given either in terms of structural 
damage or in terms of following content release. Therefore, in the mainframe of industrial risk 
analysis, existing database concerning post-earthquake, structural damage observations for 
industrial equipment must be optimized and reorganized in terms of new risk categories. Quite 
clearly, because of incomplete descriptions of the actual damage to equipment into empirical 
database considered, the definition of damage state or risk state is somehow depending on 
technical judgment other than the described consequences suffered by industrial components. 
The structural damage produced by seismic action on equipment may be referred as ‘‘damage 
state’’ (DS), in total analogy with definition, which has been extensively used to evaluate from 
the structural perspective the economical effort needed to repair and restore the tank structures. 
According to HAZUS damage classification, DS values may rank from DS1 to DS5. No damage 
is identified as DS1, slight damage to structures as DS2, moderate damage as DS3, extensive 
damage as DS4 and the total collapse of structure as DS5. 
On the other hand, as already mentioned, all typical large-scale accidental scenarios in the 
process industry (e.g. vapor cloud explosion, gas explosion, flash fire, jet fire, tank and pool 
fire, toxic dispersion) depend on the total amount of released dangerous substance. Hence, 
seismic vulnerability of large-scale industrial equipment should be expressed in terms of 
content release, integrating and extending the classical concept of exceedance probability of 
any given structural state. Eventually, a risk state RS can be defined regarding the loss of 
content from each containment system or equipment. 
For both DS and RS, probability of occurrence can be assessed by means of fragility curves F 
expressed in terms of log-normal cumulative distribution (cdf), characterized by mean µ and 
standard deviation β for any DS or RS state: 
𝐹𝐷𝑆 = 𝑐𝑑𝑓(𝜇𝐷𝑆, 𝛽𝐷𝑆, 𝑙𝑛𝑃𝐺𝐴), 𝐹𝑅𝑆 = 𝑐𝑑𝑓(𝜇𝑅𝑆, 𝛽𝑅𝑆, 𝑙𝑛𝑃𝐺𝐴)                      (1.1) 
In Equation (1.1), PGA is the realization of the seismic intensity that triggers the failure 
corresponding to the damage or risk state of interest. 
Due to the lack and uncertainties on observations, large scatter of data for values of probability 
close to zero is observed. 
Hence for the definition of PGA threshold values for any risk or damage state, a Probit analysis 
has been usefully carried out.  
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The Probit value Y allows the linearization of sigma-shaped statistical function and it is 
characterized by two constants k1 and k2: 
𝑌 = 𝑘1 + 𝑘2 ln(𝑃𝐺𝐴)  ∀𝐷𝑆, 𝑅𝑆  𝑃𝐺𝐴 𝑔𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑛 𝑎𝑠 𝑎 𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑜𝑓 𝑔             (1.2) 
The variable Y is then related to probability (fragility) by means of a simple integration. 
Fragilities F can be evaluated by databases and observational analysis if considering all possible 
failure probability (included in the DS definition), given the seismic intensity IM expressed in 
terms of peak ground acceleration: 
𝐹𝐷𝑆 = ⋃ 𝐹𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑢𝑟𝑒 ∩ 𝐼𝑀
∞
𝑖=1                                                                             (1.3) 
If any failure cannot take place for a given IM, if another value has already led the system to 
the same failure, events in the previous equation are mutually exclusive and union of events 
probability is given by the sum of the probabilities. 
1.3.1 Atmospheric storage tanks 
Dynamic behaviour of atmospheric storage tanks when subjected to earthquake is dominated 
by complex fluid–structure interaction phenomena. However, two predominant modes of 
vibration can be identified. The first one can be schematically related to a fraction of the total 
mass that behaves as rigid and moves together with the tank structure (impulsive mass), the 
other can be related to liquid sloshing (convective mass). 
Seismic actions trigger global overturning moments and base shear induced by horizontal forces 
of inertia. Overturning moment causes an increase of the vertical stress in the tank wall and 
even uplift of the base plate, while base shear can lead to relative displacements between the 
base plate and the foundation. 
Failure modes reflect these specific aspects of the seismic demand on the structure and depend 
basically upon the type of interface at the tank base. Mechanical devices are used to ensure an 
effective connection between the base plate and the foundation (unanchored or anchored). 
When unanchored tanks are of concern, friction at the base is able to ensure the needed stability 
of the structure under environmental actions, i.e. wind, but can be ineffective when strong 
ground motions take place and large relative displacements can be generated. 
On the other hand, tank sliding reduces the maximum acceleration suffered by the equipment. 
In the case of relatively small frictional factor may result in large relative displacements and 
consequently large deformations and even failure of piping and connections may occur. 
Another damage mechanism is represented by the partial uplift of the base plate. This 
phenomenon reduces the hydrodynamic forces in the tank, but can increases significantly axial 
compressive stresses of the tank wall. This is the reason why a characteristic buckling of the 
wall (elephant foot bucking—EFB) occurs. EFB is normally observed when large diameter 
tanks with height to radius (H/R) ratios in the range 2–3 are considered. 
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A different buckling mode, known as diamond shape buckling (DSB), is conversely generated 
in taller tanks, i.e. H/R about 4. It is worth noting that the EFB is related to an elastic–plastic 
state of stress, while DSB is a purely elastic buckling. Depending on the type of tank and its 
functional and structural detailing, additional structural damages can be expected, namely 
collapse of support columns for fixed roof tanks, foundation collapse due to soil liquefaction, 
splitting and leakage associated only with bolted and riveted tanks. 
Liquid sloshing during earthquake action produces several damages by fluid–structure 
interaction phenomena and can result as the main cause of equipment damage for full or nearly 
full tanks. 
Historical analysis and assessment of seismic damages of storage tanks have demonstrated that 
only full (or near full) tanks experienced catastrophic failures. Low H/R tanks only suffered 
cracks in conical roof connection, or damage by floating panel sinking. 
As EFB is concerned, it is not frequent in the case of unanchored tanks with H/R<0.8, that they 
can suffer conversely base plate and/or shell connection failures resulting in content spillage. 
A full stress analysis is certainly the most accurate way to design and to evaluate the risk of 
steel tanks under earthquake loads. This approach leads to the direct computation of the 
interaction between shell deformations and content motion during earthquakes. For base 
constrained and rigid tanks (anchored), a complete seismic analysis requires solution of 
Laplace’s equation for the motion of the contained liquid, in order to obtain the total pressure 
history on the tank shell during earthquakes. When flexible tanks are considered, a structural 
deformation term must be also added to take account of the “impulsive” and “convective” 
contributions. 
Actually, the quantitative assessment of risk within a complex industrial installation needs the 
analysis of a large number of components. Hence, for sake of simplification, statistical and 
empirical tools derived from post-accident analysis are useful to define easy to manage and 
general vulnerability functions. 
DS values have been reviewed as three levels of intensity of loss of containment, defined as RS 
(risk state): no loss—RS1, moderate loss—RS2, extensive loss of containment—RS3. 
Tables 1.2 and 1.3, taken from Salzano et al. (2003), report the coefficients µ and β of 
cumulative log-normal distribution for the probability of occurrence of RS for anchored and 
unanchored storage tanks respectively, and the correspondent coefficients k1 and k2 for Probit 
function, depending on PGA expressed in terms of g fractions (acceleration of gravity). 
Threshold values for the PGA for each damage or risk state (PGAk) are also reported for the 
sake of early warning systems issues. 
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Table 1.2. Seismic fragility and Probit coefficients for anchored atmospheric 
steel tanks. 
RS Fill Level µ(g) β(g) k1 k2 PGAk(g) 
≥2 near full 0.30 0.60 7.01 1.67 0.074 
3 near full 1.25 0.65 4.66 1.54 0.275 
≥2 ≥50% 0.71 0.80 5.43 1.25 0.110 
3 ≥50% 3.72 0.80 3.36 1.25 0.577 
 
Table 1.3. Seismic fragility and Probit coefficients for unanchored 
atmospheric steel tanks. 
RS Fill Level µ(g) β(g) k1 k2 PGAk(g) 
≥2 near full 0.15 0.70 7.71 1.43 0.029 
3 near full 0.68 0.75 5.51 1.34 0.118 
≥2 ≥50% Nd     
3 ≥50% 1.06 0.80 4.93 1.25 0.164 
 
The term “Nd” in table 1.3 means that data for statistical analysis are insufficient or not 
available. The terms µ, β, k1and k2, reported in Table 1.2 and 1.3, are, respectively, the 
cumulative distribution function parameters and the Probit coefficients (Equations (1.1) and 
(1.2), respectively). PGAk is the threshold value for the risk state. 
Results reported in Tables 1.2 and 1.3 can be used as basic information to predict accidental 
scenarios as fires (pool fire, flash fire, tank fire), explosions (in the case of formation large 
vapour cloud) or, when toxic vapour are formed, for the dispersion analysis. 
1.4 Floods 
The increasing frequency of severe natural events caused by climate changes raised a concern 
about the possible interference of these external hazards with industrial activities. However, 
presently scarce attention is devoted to the assessment of the risk related to accidents triggered 
by natural events, as well as to the prevention and to the consequence assessment of the specific 
accidental scenarios. 
The selection and characterization of reference flood events may be based on the return time 
and on two severity parameters of the flood: the maximum water depth expected at the site and 
the flood energy, usually expressed as the maximum expected water speed. Even if these 
parameters are usually not reported in general flood hazard assessment studies, they may 
become available from specific analyses carried out on the site. Again, it should be remarked 
that by no means these parameters may be sufficient to fully characterize the flood hazard of a 
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site, but they are suitable to characterize the severity of the reference events in the present 
approach. 
The following step in the evaluation of industrial accidents triggered by floods is the 
identification of the reference incidental scenarios due to the release of hazardous materials 
following the flood. In order to identify the reference scenarios that need to be considered, three 
parameters should be analysed:  
• the hazardous properties of the substances;  
• the hold-up of the equipment, which influences the quantity of substance released;  
• the expected type of structural damage.  
Antonioni et al. (2009) state that storage tanks are the equipment items more frequently affected 
by loss of containment triggered by flood. 
In the case of floods, besides substances having “conventional” hazards considered in off-site 
consequence assessment of industrial accidents (flammability or toxicity), the analysis should 
be extended to substances reacting with water and/or developing flammable/toxic gases in 
contact with water. Indeed, it must be remarked that besides conventional release scenarios 
(fires, explosions and toxic clouds), floods may cause two further critical events: significant 
environmental contamination due to water pollution, and release of toxic gases and flammable 
vapours generated by reactions of chemicals with water. 
Also in the case of floods, reference damage states were defined to characterize equipment 
damage. Damage states were defined on the basis of equipment classification based on 
structural characteristics. The equipment categories defined are the following: (i) cylindrical 
vertical vessels having diameter to height (D/H) ratio higher than 1 (atmospheric); (ii) 
cylindrical vertical vessels having D/H<1 (atmospheric and pressurized); (iii) cylindrical 
horizontal vessels (atmospheric and pressurized). 
Three possible modalities of water impact were assumed and were associated to credible 
typologies and extents of structural damage: slow submersion (water velocity negligible), low-
speed wave (water velocity below 1 m/s), and high-speed wave (water velocity higher than 1 
m/s). Also in the case of floods, three classes of releases were considered for storage and process 
equipment, as well as for piping: R1 defines the instantaneous release of the complete inventory 
(in less than 2 min) following severe structural damage; R2 the continuous release of the 
complete inventory (in more than 10 min); R3 the continuous release from a hole having an 
equivalent diameter of 10 mm. This classification is the opposite of the one made in the case of 
earthquake damage. 
The accidental scenarios that are expected to follow the releases were identified by the event 
tree technique, taking into account the possible scenarios deriving from substances reacting 
with water. 
In the case of floods, no simplified equipment damage models are available in the literature. 
Very limited data are available in the open literature to analyse in detail the damage caused by 
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floods to industrial equipment. The information about past accidents recorded in industrial 
accident databases is usually not sufficiently detailed, in particular with respect to the 
description of the structural damage of equipment caused by the flood. Furthermore, in several 
reports available for past accidents, the flood severity parameters are not recorded. 
1.5 Seveso directive 
The chief piece of legislation in Europe relating to the prevention and control of chemical 
accidents is the ‘Seveso Directive’, which has its roots in the aftermath of the industrial accident 
that occurred in Italy in the mid-70s. 
In 1976, an explosion in a small chemical plant led to the release of a toxic cloud containing 
2,3,7,8-tetrachlorodibenzo-p-dioxin (TCDD) that contaminated a densely-populated area of 
about 10 square miles between Milan and Lake Como. The cloud was concentrated around the 
municipality of Seveso, located downwind from the plant. 
The accident led to the adoption in 1982 of the European Union Directive 82/501/EC relating 
to major chemical accidents, which came to be known as the ‘Seveso Directive’. The legislation 
aims to prevent the occurrence of major accidents at sites that store, produce or make use of 
dangerous substances in sufficient quantities to constitute a serious health, safety and/or 
environmental risk, and to limit the consequences for people and the environment in the event 
of such an accident. 
Within the European Union (EU), in ‘Seveso I’ regulatory environment for the chemical process 
industry (EC, 1982), major accidents have been defined as “sudden, unexpected, unplanned 
events, resulting from uncontrolled developments during an industrial activity, which actually 
or potentially cause serious immediate or delayed adverse effects (death, injuries, poisoning or 
hospitalisation) to a number of people inside and/or outside the installation”, (EC, 1982, 1988). 
‘Seveso I’ was later amended in view of the lessons learned from later accidents such as Bhopal 
or Toulouse resulting into ‘Seveso II’ (Directive 96/82/EC). 
The ‘Seveso II Directive’ which replaces and strengthens ‘Seveso I’, includes now a concise 
and unequivocal definition of what constitutes a “major accident” based on precise quantitative 
threshold criteria which will most probably result in an overall lowering of the criteria for 
notification. In addition, it introduces the concept of safety management system and it requires 
also attention for domino effects to neighbouring plants, for land use planning, and for care in 
plant modifications. 
The legislation applies to establishments where various dangerous substances are present in 
quantities equal to, or above, a given threshold, while the legislation does not apply to certain 
activities and installations, such as military establishments, land-fills, hazards caused by 
ionising radiation, and the transport of dangerous substances outside the establishments. 
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In 2012 ‘Seveso III’ was adopted considering, amongst others, the changes in the Union 
legislation on the classification of chemicals and increased rights for citizens to access 
information and justice. It replaces the previous ‘Seveso II Directive’. 
The Directive now applies to more than 10 000 industrial establishments in the European Union 
where dangerous substances are used or stored in large quantities, mainly in the chemical, 
petrochemical, logistics and metal refining sectors. 
There’s also another statement added in the Annex II of ‘Seveso III Directive’ that is worth 
noting because it’s significant for the aim of this thesis. It says that a detailed description of the 
possible major-accident scenarios and their probability or the conditions under which they 
occur is needed including also natural causes, for example earthquakes or floods.  
Thus, it’s important to understand how to consider these natural events in the risk assessment 
procedure and this is the main topic of Chapter 3.
  
  
Chapter 2 
Conventional risk assessment 
The topic of this chapter is the description of the classical risk assessment procedure, which is 
composed by several steps. But first it’s highlighted the distinction between hazard and risk and 
their definitions, since they are important features when dealing with industrial risk assessment. 
2.1 Risk and hazard 
Comprehensive and complete identification and assessment of potential hazards and risks in 
the process industry are of primary importance. First of all, it’s meaningful to define the 
concepts of hazard and risk. A hazard is “any property or intrinsic quality of a specific factor 
that has the potentiality to cause damages”, whereas a risk is “the probability to reach the 
potential threshold of damage in the conditions of use and exposition to a specific factor or 
agent or both of them”, according respectively to the D. Lgs. of 9 April 2008, n. 81, art. 2, 
paragraph 1, letter r and s. 
The risk (R) is defined as the product of the occurrence frequency (f) and the magnitude of 
consequences (M): 
𝑅 = 𝑓 ∙ 𝑀 
Based on this equation, a risk could be high when events are frequent but with low 
consequences, or when there are rare events with catastrophic consequences. This distinction is 
important dealing with risk reducing measures because it’s possible to undertake mitigation 
measures to minimize the probability of the undesired event, or prevention measures to prevent 
the consequences of the event. 
2.2 Risk assessment procedure 
The conventional risk assessment procedure is reported in Figure 2.1, where it’s easy to see all 
the steps involved in the analysis. 
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Figure 2.1. Hazard identification and Risk assessment procedure 
2.2.1. Hazard Identification 
Once the system description is given, the first step of the risk assessment procedure is the 
Hazard Identification (HazId), which is a fundamental stage, that requires to know the process, 
the plant equipment, and raw materials and products involved. It can be carried out with several 
approaches, that can be qualitative, or semi-quantitative. 
2.2.1.1 The qualitative methods 
Among the qualitative methods there are: the historical analysis of incidents and accidents, 
check lists and the “what if” analysis. 
The historical analysis consists in the investigation and collection of all the accidents that are 
similar to the one supposed (similar plants, similar materials/products, similar climatic 
conditions, etc.).  Data banks are essential when dealing with this method. 
The check list is intended to promote thought; to raise questions such as: is it needed, what are 
the alternatives, has provision been made for, checked for, has it been provided?  
Some companies make use of safety indices as a tool for assessing the relative risk of a new 
process or plant. The most widely used safety index is the Dow Fire and Explosion Index, 
developed by the Dow Chemical Company. A numerical “fire and explosion index” (F & EI) 
is calculated, based on the nature of the process and the properties of the process materials. The 
larger the value of the F & EI, the more hazardous the process. 
Judgment, based on experience with very similar processes, is needed to decide the magnitude 
of the various factors used in the calculation of the index, and the loss control credit factors. 
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What If Analysis is a structured brainstorming method of determining what things can go wrong 
and judging the likelihood and consequences of those situations occurring. The answers to these 
questions form the basis for making judgments regarding the acceptability of those risks and 
determining a recommended course of action for those risks judged to be unacceptable. 
2.2.1.2 The semi-quantitative methods  
The semi-quantitative approaches are: HazOp (Hazard and Operability study), FMEA (Failure 
Mode and Effect Analysis) and FMECA (Failure Mode, Effect and Criticality Analysis). 
A hazard and operability study is a systematic procedure for critical examination of the 
operability of a process. When applied to a process design or an operating plant, it indicates 
potential hazards that may arise from deviations from the intended design conditions and it can 
help in the individuation of the “top events”, that are the possible incident or accident events. 
The technique was developed by the Petrochemicals Division of Imperial Chemical Industries, 
and is now in general use in the chemical and process industries.  
A formal operability study of the design, vessel by vessel and line by line, using “guide words” 
to help generate thought about the way deviations from the intended operation can cause 
hazardous situations. The seven guide words recommended are given in table 2.1. In addition 
to these words, the following words are also used in a special way, and have the precise 
meanings given below: 
• Intention: the intention defines how the particular part of the process was intended to 
operate; 
• Deviations: these are departures from the designer’s intention that are detected by the 
systematic application of the guide words; 
• Causes: reasons why, and how, the deviation could occur; 
• Consequences: the results that follow from the occurrence of a meaningful deviation. 
• Hazards: consequences that can cause damage (loss) or injury. 
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Table 2.1. A list of guide words with their meaning and comments. 
GUIDE WORD MEANING COMMENTS 
NO Complete negation, e.g. of INTENTION NO forward flow when there should be 
MORE Quantitative increase MORE of any relevant physical property than there 
should be (e.g. higher flow, temperature, pressure, 
viscosity, etc. also actions: heat and reaction) 
LESS Quantitative decrease LESS of … (as above) 
AS WELL AS Quantitative increase All design and operating INTENTIONS are achieved 
together with some addition (e.g. Impurities, extra 
phase) 
PART OF Quantitative decrease Only some of INTENTIONS are achieved, some are not 
REVERSE Opposite of INTENTION Reverse flow or chemical reaction (e.g. inject acid 
instead of alkali in pH control) 
OTHER THAN Complete substitution or miscellaneous No part of original INTENTION achieved, something 
quite different occurs. Also start-up, shutdown, 
alternative mode of operation, catalyst change, 
corrosion, etc. 
 
Failure-mode effect analysis (FMEA) is a method originally developed in manufacturing, 
which is used to determine the relative importance of different component failures within an 
overall system or product. It assigns numerical rankings to different failure modes based on the 
(qualitative) perceptions of the participants. Different groups or individuals will not necessarily 
reach the same conclusions, so the method is best used in the early stages of design as a means 
of brainstorming for safety issues. More rigorous methods such as HazOp should be applied 
when more design details are available. 
2.2.2. Quantitative hazard analysis 
Methods such as FMEA, HazOp and use of safety indices will identify potential hazards, but 
give only qualitative guidance on the likelihood of an incident occurrence and the loss suffered. 
In a quantitative hazard analysis, the engineer attempts to determine the probability of an event 
occurring. The most used quantitative approaches are the fault tree and the event tree. 
2.2.2.1. Fault tree 
Incidents usually occur through the coincident failure of two or more items: failure of 
equipment, control systems and instruments, and mis-operation.  
The fault tree analysis (FTA) is a deductive (“Top-Down”) procedure that examines the 
sequence of events leading to the top event, a hazardous incident. It starts from the top event 
(TE), identified for instance during the HazOp analysis, and, asking for what failure can cause 
it, arrives to the initiator events (the breakdowns, the faults).  
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In figure 2.2 there is an illustrative example of a fault tree. 
Figure 2.2. Example of a fault tree. Letter A stands for AND operator, letter B stands for 
OR operator. 
This method is useful because it permits not only to have a representation of the paths necessary 
to obtain the TE but also to estimate its occurrence probability. This is possible to realize when 
the failure frequencies or probabilities of each initiator event are known. The frequency 
determines the number of failures in a defined period of time while the probability is a 
dimensionless number. These values can be combined adopting the Boolean algebra. In the 
fault tree, two are the most used logical gates: AND and OR. The AND logical operator is used 
where all the inputs are necessary before the system fails, and the OR logical operator where 
failure of any input, by itself, would cause failure of the system. If the events (initiator or 
intermediate) are connected with an AND logical operator, the probability (frequency) of the 
output event is calculated as the product of the probability (frequency) of all input events; while, 
if an OR logical gate is used, the output event probability (frequency) is calculated as the sum 
of all input events probabilities (frequencies). 
The equation to calculate the frequency of the top event (TE) of the Figure 2.2 is: 
𝑇𝐸 = 𝐼𝐸3 ∙ 𝐸1 = 𝐼𝐸3 ∙ (𝐼𝐸1 + 𝐼𝐸2) 
The fault tree analysis is deterministic since a mean value of failure frequency is taken into 
account for each initiator event. 
2.2.2.2. Event tree 
An event tree analysis (ETA) is an inductive procedure (“Bottom-Up”) that shows all possible 
outcomes resulting from an accidental (initiating) event and additional events and factors. By 
studying all relevant accidental events (that have been identified by a preliminary hazard 
analysis, a HazOp, or some other technique), the ETA can be used to identify all potential 
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accident scenarios and sequences in a complex system. Unlike the fault tree analysis, in which 
the top event has to be stated, in the event tree analysis the starting point is an initial event, 
which is the release of some dangerous substance (toxic, flammable or explosive) in most cases. 
Then it’s possible to identify the direct consequences (fires, explosions, toxic emissions, etc.) 
or the indirect ones (for example the domino effect). The event tree is composed of nodes and 
each node represents a different question to which the only possible answers are yes or no; it’s 
possible to build a very branched tree defining and responding to all questions that can influence 
the development of the initial event into the final event (the accidental scenario). 
Design and procedural weaknesses can be identified, and probabilities of the various outcomes 
from an accidental event can be determined. 
In Figure 2.3 there is an example of an event tree. 
Figure 2.3. Example of an event tree. 
2.2.2.3. Bow-Tie diagram 
The Bow-Tie diagram represents the fault tree and the event tree together. It is suitable to 
visualize the relationship between undesirable event, its causes, accidental scenarios and their 
consequences. 
In Figure 2.4 there is a scheme of a bow-tie diagram. 
Figure 2.4. Scheme of a bow tie diagram 
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As it can be seen in Figure 2.4, in the middle of the scheme there is the critical event (CE), 
while the left part is the fault tree, that identifies the possible causes of the CE, and the right 
part is the event tree, that, indeed, identifies the possible consequences of the CE. The bow-tie 
technique in its visual form makes the analysis easy to understand, and can show what 
safeguards protect against particular initiating causes and loss event consequences.
  
 
 
  
Chapter 3 
Modification on the classical risk 
assessment 
The aim of this chapter is to highlight the limitations of the conventional risk assessment and 
to present how it can be modified, in such a way that also the so called atypical events can be 
considered. 
3.1 Limitations of the Hazard Identification 
In the previous chapter the approaches to carry out the Hazard Identification were itemised and 
explained. But none of them seems to cover the issue of accident scenarios falling out of normal 
expectations of unwanted events and their dynamical integration into Hazard Identification 
(HazId) process. Furthermore, Hazard Identification should face some theoretical and practical 
limitations that affect the quality of the results. The Centre for Chemical and Process Safety 
identifies five main limitations in the application of Hazard Identification techniques:  
i) Completeness: some accident situations, causes, and effects may have been 
unintentionally neglected;  
ii) Reproducibility: assumptions from the analyst may affect results; 
iii) Inscrutability: results may be difficult to understand and synthesize for use; 
iv) Relevance of experience: lack of specific experience may lead to neglect the 
significance some aspects;  
v) Subjectivity: since analysts may have to use their judgment when extrapolating from 
their experience).  
Some of these limitations significantly hinder the identification of “atypical” accidents 
scenarios. 
3.1.1 “Atypical” accident scenarios 
Since 1976, when the major accident of Seveso (Italy) occurred, it was clear how complete and 
effective activities of appraisal and assessment of potential hazards in the process industry are 
of primary importance for the prevention of such accident scenarios. In fact, what remains 
unidentified cannot be prevented or mitigated and a latent risk is more dangerous than a 
recognized one due to the relative lack of emergency preparedness.  
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This type of scenarios can be classified as “atypical” because they cannot be captured by 
standard risk analysis processes and common HazId techniques due to their deviation from 
normal expectations of unwanted events or worst case reference scenarios. 
Another latent risk can be represented by the accident scenarios related to new and emerging 
technologies, which are not still properly identified, and that may remain unidentified until they 
take place for the first time. Examples of new and emerging technologies can be found within 
the fields of Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) regasification and Carbon Capture and Storage 
(CCS), where new and alternative technologies are being defined and the scale and extent of 
both the substances (LNG and CO2) handling is set to increase dramatically. Thus, a lack of 
substantial operational experience may lead to difficulties in identifying accurately the hazards 
associated with the process. Hence, these new and emerging hazards may comply with the 
definition of “atypical” scenarios previously discussed. 
Furthermore, industrial risk assessment should take account of consequences and probability of 
occurrence of accidental scenarios triggered by natural events. 
Atypical events may be classified in two separate groups: 
• “Unknown Unknowns”: these are the type of events that have never occur or for which 
there is no available information; 
• “Unknown Knowns”: these are events that the risk analyst is not aware could know 
considering near misses or past accidents. 
Risk awareness is a fundamental factor to tackle the issue of atypical accident scenarios and, 
together with an effective knowledge management, would make possible the achievement of a 
complete and effective process of risk management. Moreover, when dealing with atypical 
scenarios, it should not be forgotten that an accident affecting a complex system is a multiple 
and unexpected interaction of failures and there is not one single cause.  
The implementation of a strong safety culture within the plant is of paramount importance for 
the prevention of unforeseen events, especially for “Unknown Unknowns”. One way to deal 
with this problem is to improve early detection of deviations in the causal chain by means of 
specific monitoring systems. In fact, the development of appropriate proactive indicators would 
help to increase organizational awareness (mindfulness) of safety and reduce complacency in 
organizations where major accidents are possible but rare. 
To face “Unknown Knowns” a comprehensive process of identification based on early 
warnings, capturing evidence of new hazards to consider as soon as they come to light, is 
essential.  
Conventional risk assessment has the disadvantage of being static and fails to capture 
emergence of new hazards. For this reason, a specific method named Dynamic Procedure for 
Atypical Scenarios Identification (DyPASI) was developed to obtain comprehensive hazard 
identification including Atypical Scenarios. 
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3.2 Dynamic Procedure for Atypical Scenarios Identification (DyPASI) 
DyPASI is an HazId method aiming at the systematization of information from early signals of 
risk related to past accident events, near-misses and risk studies. It supports the identification 
and the assessment of atypical potential accident scenarios related to the substances, the 
equipment and the industrial site considered. 
The application of DyPASI entails a systematic screening process that, based on early warnings 
and risk notions, should be able to identify possible Atypical Scenarios or Unknown Knowns 
available at the time of the analysis. The well-established approach of the bow-tie analysis, 
which aims at the identification of all the potential major-accident scenarios occurring in a 
process industry, was taken as a basis to develop the methodology. A general flow-chart of the 
methodology is provided in Figure 3.1, that also evidences its integration in the risk 
management framework. 
Figure 3.1. DyPASI steps and their inclusion in the process of risk assessment. 
DyPASI may be used either as a stand-alone HazId technique or may be coupled with existing 
conventional techniques. In the latter case, it may effectively integrate the existing hazard 
identification methods to obtain more exhaustive results. In particular, it provides a structured 
and yet dynamic approach in the retrieval of information from early warnings and atypical 
scenarios, which is not present in the conventional application of other HazId techniques. 
The format of the results from DyPASI allows for a particularly easy integration with the HazId 
techniques based on fault tree and event tree analysis, effectively extending the applicability of 
DyPASI from the preliminary analysis to the assessment of detailed plant systems. 
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3.2.1 Bow-tie analysis 
DyPASI is a development of the bow-tie technique, which, by itself, is a qualitative hazard 
evaluation technique ideally suited for the initial analysis of an existing process or application 
during the intermediate stages of process design. Thus, as a preliminary activity (step 0) 
DyPASI requires the application of the conventional bow-tie technique to identify the relevant 
critical events. The development of bow-ties can be performed following conventional 
guidelines as those outlined by the Centre for Chemical Process Safety or the MIMAH tool. 
3.2.2 Retrieval of risk notions 
In the first step of DyPASI application, a search for relevant information concerning undetected 
potential hazards and accident scenarios that may not have been considered in conventional 
bow-tie development is carried out. It can be summarized in 3 steps: 
• Definition of the information need and search systems to search on  
• Formulation of a query to send to the search system  
• Assessment of the relevance of results  
Search boundaries must be outlined and quoted in the formulation of the query, in the 
combination and number the analyst considers more appropriate. Examples of search 
boundaries used in queries are: the site, the process, the equipment, the substance, and the 
substance state. 
3.2.3 Prioritization 
Once the necessary information is gathered, a determination is made as to whether the data are 
significant enough to trigger further action and proceed with the process of risk assessment. As 
a support of this process of prioritization (step 2 of DyPASI application), a register collecting 
the risk notions obtained from the retrieval process and showing their relative relevance and 
impact can be obtained. Possible consequences can be determined based on the risk notions and 
ranked by means of the following scale of severity levels:  
• Near miss: an event that does not result in an actual loss but that has the potential to do 
so. 
• Mishap: an event that could cause minor health effects and/or minor impact to property 
and the environment. 
• Incident: an event that could cause major health effect or injury, localized damage to 
assets and environment, considerable loss of production and impact on reputation. 
• Accident: an event that may cause one or more fatalities or permanent major disabilities, 
and/or heavy financial loss. 
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• Disaster: an event that could cause multiple fatalities and extensive damage to property, 
system and production. It may cause a shutdown of the plant for a significant time period 
and sometimes forever. 
Step 2 describes a qualitative prioritization of severity. It will be a task of the user of DyPASI 
to extrapolate early warnings of a potential atypical accident scenario. The classification of 
gathered data performed on the basis of relevance and impact will help the user to identify the 
most pertinent and serious signals. 
3.2.4 Identification of atypical scenarios 
In this step, the potential scenarios are isolated from the early warnings gathered and a cause-
consequence chain consistent with the bow-tie diagram is developed. This allows for the 
integration of the pattern of the atypical scenario the bow-tie of hazards previously identified 
at step 0.  
There are many well-known methodologies for past accident analysis that can be applied to 
obtain a reduction to a cause-consequence chain consistent with the bow-tie diagram 
characteristics. This procedure suggested within DyPASI takes indication from the Why Tree 
technique. At first, the Basic Event (BE), the Critical Event (CE) and the Outcome Event (OE), 
which are the main elements of a bow-tie diagram, must be identified within the potential 
atypical scenario. Then, the other elements are defined asking the question “why?”, or, more 
specifically “what is directly necessary and sufficient to cause this event?”, starting from OE 
and going backward through CE until BE. The number of the “Intermediate Events” and 
“Events” can vary for other techniques of bow-tie analysis.  
Once a specific pattern to describe the atypical scenario is defined, one or more suitable bow-
tie diagrams obtained in step 0 may be identified for the process of integration. The specific 
search boundaries used in the previous steps and the defined CE should be used for the 
identification of appropriate bow-tie diagrams. If no suitable diagram is identified, the atypical 
scenario pattern must be considered a new bow-tie diagram itself, which should be added to the 
set of HazId results. 
The process of integration of an atypical scenario in a bow-tie diagram may be obtained by a 
specific methodology based on set theory. The approach is able to ensure complete and concise 
results, without the need to re-develop a HazId study from the beginning. 
The integration of the atypical scenario pattern should be performed considering one half of the 
diagram at a time and should move level-by-level from the CE to the BE (if the fault tree section 
is considered) or OE (of the event tree is considered). Regarding Figure 3.2, the following 
guidelines must be applied for each event level: 
1) If 𝐸𝐴𝑡𝑦,𝑛 (it’s the set of atypical events 𝑒𝐴𝑡𝑦,𝑛in the event position n) is a subsystem of 
𝐸𝑖𝑛𝑖,𝑛 (it’s the set of initial events 𝑒𝑖𝑛𝑖,𝑛 in position n; that is 𝐸𝑖𝑛𝑖,𝑛 = 𝐸𝑛) and ∃ a 
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function f: 𝐸𝑛 → 𝐸𝑛−1 surjective (it means that per each initial event 𝑒𝑖𝑛𝑖,𝑛−1 exists 
𝑒𝑖𝑛𝑖,𝑛) ⇒ consider next level (n+1) 
2) If 𝐸𝐴𝑡𝑦,𝑛 − 𝐸𝑖𝑛𝑖,𝑛 ≠ ∅ ⇒ integrate it and consider 𝐸𝑛 = 𝐸𝐴𝑡𝑦,𝑛 ∪ 𝐸𝑖𝑛𝑖,𝑛 
3) If f: 𝐸𝑛 → 𝐸𝑛−1 is not surjective ⇒ duplicate 𝑒𝐴𝑡𝑦,𝑛| f becomes surjective 
For n=1…, N event levels. 
𝐸𝑛 is the set of all events and the initial events are events identified with the conventional hazard 
identification. 
The scheme of the right-hand part of a bow-tie diagram using the three guidelines is shown in 
Figure 3.2. 
Figure 3.2. Scheme of the right-hand part of the bow-tie diagram using the three 
guidelines; the Critical Event is in position n=0 and the outcome events in position n=N. 
3.2.5 Identification of safety measures 
The definition of safety measures applied to the elements of bow-tie diagrams is the last step of 
the DyPASI procedure. In this step, past experience concerning the effectiveness and 
performance of safety barriers may be encompassed in the analysis. 
The integrated bow-tie diagrams including the atypical scenarios should be completed 
considering safety barriers, classified by their effectiveness. The generic safety functions can 
be divided into these four actions to be achieved: 
• Measures to avoid: safety function acting upstream of the bow-tie diagram event aiming 
to suppress the inherent conditions that cause it. 
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• Measures to prevent: safety function acting upstream of the bow-tie diagram event 
aiming to reduce its occurrence. 
• Measures to control: safety function acting upstream of the fault tree event in response 
to a drift which may lead to the event and safety function acting downstream of the 
event-tree event aiming to stop it. 
• Measures to limit: safety function acting downstream of the bow-tie diagram event 
aiming to mitigate it. 
The safety barriers can be physical and engineered systems or human actions based on specific 
procedures, or administrative controls which can directly implement the safety functions 
described. 
DyPASI introduces a further distinction between safety barriers represented in the bow-tie 
diagram: safety barriers properly acting should be marked in green (green colour is also applied 
to effective safety barriers in the case of near-misses); safety barriers that showed deficiencies 
in at least one past accident are marked in orange; new potential, and hopefully more effective, 
safety barriers identified are represented using the red colour. 
This activity can also provide important elements for the risk mitigation process in the decision-
making phase of risk management. 
3.3 Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) 
As soon as the integrated bow-ties are available, the follow-up consists in carrying out the 
conventional risk management procedure.  
Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA), once potentially hazardous events are identified, is a 
formal and systematic approach of estimating their likelihood and consequences, and 
expressing the results as risk to people, the environment or the infrastructures. 
The main result of a QRA is the estimation of failure frequency values, which usually is derived 
by coupling results provided by the fault tree analysis, which mainly takes into account 
anomalies of mechanical components, control and protective device as main failure cause, and 
the event tree analysis, performed to define potential damage consequences induced by each 
identified top event. 
The QRA approach is deterministic since a mean value of failure frequency is considered for 
each initiator event. If seismic risk is concerned, the deterministic approach is based on the 
maximum “credible” intensity of earthquake as the triggering event and a conservative estimate 
(“worst case” assumption) for the subsequent accidental scenario is made depending on the 
interaction of the earthquake shaking with equipment, which can result in a loss of material or 
energy. In the above form, the deterministic approach leads often to a significant overestimation 
of the risk, so that such a risk grade becomes both economically and politically not sustainable, 
e.g. in the case of civil protection action. Moreover, the uncertainties related to the initial 
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conditions of the seismic scenario, to the failure of equipment, and to the uncertainties in the 
analysis of consequences of the possible destructive phenomena following the loss of hazardous 
substances are often too large.  
3.3.1 Probabilistic fault tree framework 
Thus, it’s evident that the classical quantitative risk analysis doesn’t provide a complete 
investigation since it doesn’t consider uncertainties related in the estimation of temporal 
occurrence of each singular initiator event and, in addition, natural hazards are not frequently 
considered in QRAs due to challenges related to the evaluation of their consequences in the 
chemical process industry. 
These circumstances lead analysts to use a probabilistic approach, where uncertainties are 
explicitly considered and described by probability distributions. 
3.3.1.1 Primary failure probability estimates 
The commonly used techniques to estimate primary failure probabilities are mainly based on 
generic data available in literature, specific studies and reliability. Data are deterministic, so 
failure frequencies are average values derived from dataset of past accidents, without taking 
into account any variability in frequency estimation. 
In the probabilistic fault tree framework, frequency mean value data and related standard 
deviations are indeed used to build probability density functions of the frequency values 
associated to each initiator event. A lognormal function is assumed for each initiator event 
frequency. A set of n simulations is performed for estimating component release probabilities.  
For each random simulation, a i-th frequency value λi is sampled from each frequency probability 
density function. Finally, the probability values Pi(λi) are subdivided according to LNE 
Department (2009) into three possible release states (RS) as follows: 
 
- Pi,RS1 (λi) corresponding to RS1, (i.e. small release), estimated as 84% of Pi(λi); 
- Pi,RS2 (λi) corresponding to RS2, (i.e. moderate release), estimated as 8% of Pi(λi); 
- Pi,RS3 (λi) corresponding to RS3, (i.e. high release), estimated as 8% of Pi(λi). 
3.3.1.2 Seismic probability estimates 
Chemical plants can be subject to an increase of failure rate if located in areas prone to seismic 
hazard. In such cases, release can be a direct consequence of earthquake-induced structural 
failure of tanks, pipes and other elements drift- or acceleration- sensitive.  
Hence, seismic hazard must be adequately taken into account in probabilistic terms since 
earthquakes can occur at several sites and can be characterized by different magnitudes 
following specific recurrence laws.  
If a structural component is located in a site, it is possible to define its seismic hazard curve 
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according to the results provided in the National Building Codes with regard to Probabilistic 
Seismic Hazard Analysis. The goal of PSHA is to estimate the probability of exceeding various 
ground-motion levels given all possible earthquakes that could affect the site of interest in a 
preset time window T.  
For each ground motion level, by fixing a preset time window and selecting a specific intensity 
measure, it is possible to perform the seismic hazard disaggregation analysis. Seismic hazard 
disaggregation allows engineers to identify the values of some characteristics earthquakes that 
provide the largest contributions to the hazard at a specific site of interest. These events can be 
viewed in probabilistic terms as the k earthquakes dominating the seismic hazard of a site.  
Once identified such k scenarios in terms of event magnitude M and epicenter distance R from 
the site of interest, it is possible to define for each of them a lognormal probability distribution 
of the selected intensity measure through a Ground Motion Prediction Equation (GMPE). On 
such basis, also in this case, a set of n simulations are performed for estimating component 
release probabilities. For each i-th simulation, k intensity measure values IMi,x are randomly 
sampled by respective GMPE probability density functions. 
Once desegregated seismic hazard, the following step is the assessment of probabilities of 
detecting a certain damage state: in this regard, seismic vulnerability of chemical plant 
component can be described, as said in Chapter 1, through fragility functions, representative of 
exceedance probability values for a set of possible damage states as a function of a specific 
intensity measure value to which an element is subject during an earthquake.  
In the framework of the QRA, the estimation of loss of hazardous materials is the most 
challenging issue but it is necessary for properly assess consequences of potential failures. 
Hence, structural damage states must be converted in terms of release states RS, which are the 
same of that previously described. In such way fragility curves in terms of exceedance 
probability of a set of possible release states (RS1, RS2, RS3) are taken into account, adopting 
fragility coefficients reported in Tables 1.2 and 1.3. 
So for each intensity measure value IMi,x, RS1, RS2 and RS3 release state probabilities Pi,RSj 
(IMi,x) are computed: for each i
th simulation, all these values are then condensed taking into 
account disaggregation percent contributions %x of each k
th considered event, as follows: 
𝑃𝑖 ,𝑅𝑆𝑗 = ∑(%𝑥) ∙ 𝑃𝑖 ,𝑅𝑆𝑗 (𝐼𝑀𝑖,𝑥)
𝑘
𝑥=1
∙
1
𝑇𝑅,𝑥
 
where TR,x is the return time of each considered event. 
3.3.1.3 Final probability aggregation 
The last step of the probabilistic fault tree analysis method is the aggregation of probability 
values derived from the primary and the seismic failure estimates. Release probability values 
derived in the ith simulation from the electro-mechanical initiator events branch and earthquake 
occurrence branch are thus processed according to the fault tree diagram (taking into account 
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logical operators AND, OR) to derive a final set of aggregate release probability values for RS1, 
RS2 and RS3. The analysis is repeated performing n simulations and thus leading to define 
release probability value distributions for each release state analyzed.
  
Chapter 4 
Case study – DyPASI analysis 
It’s considered the Green Refinery of Porto Marghera, in particular it’s taken into account the 
storage section S-111. 
In order to apply the modified risk analysis, it’s important to decide where to place the plant 
and then study the vulnerability of the plant site. Afterwards it’s possible to apply the DyPASI 
analysis with the aim of including the NaTechs in the risk assessment. Once the bow-tie is 
updated, the last step, that is submitted in Chapter 5, is the quantitative risk assessment done in 
probabilistic terms. 
4.1 The plant 
In this thesis, it’s considered the Refinery of Porto Marghera (VE). In 2013, the Refinery of 
Porto Marghera decided to integrate the conventional refinery scheme with the plan of a “Green 
Refinery”, that allow the production of high-quality innovative biofuels (such as Green Diesel, 
Green LPG and Green Naphtha) from biomasses. In Figure 4.1 it’s shown the block flow 
diagram of the process that produces the green diesel. 
 
Figure 4.1. Block flow diagram of the plant. 
The Ecofining™ technology is based on two steps:  
- the hydro-deoxygenation, where the oxygen is removed and a linear paraffinic 
hydrocarbon, with poor cold properties, is produced;  
- the isomerization, that is necessary to improve the cold properties of the fuel and so a 
paraffinic hydrocarbon with branched chains is obtained. 
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The case study is focused in the storage S-111 used to stock the produced green diesel after the 
isomerisation step and it’s shown in Figure 4.2.  
Figure 4.2. Green diesel S-111 storage graphic representation. 
4.2 Plant location 
The purpose of this thesis is to study and to add the seismic risk within the risk analysis, thus 
the choice of the location of the plant is a key point.  
In seismic terms, Italy has three great areas. It is visible in Figure 4.3 that the high-risk areas 
are Apennines, Sicily and Friuli. 
Figure 4.3. Seismic map of Italy. The legend expresses all the PGAs in terms of g. Two great 
seismic areas are along Apennines and in Friuli, due to orogeny. 
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This hazard is due to the orogeny mechanism: in these areas, there are relatively young 
mountains, created by the clash between the Euro Asiatic plate and the African one. For this 
reason, in order to study the effects of an earthquake on an industrial production, it is important 
to choose wisely the location. 
In this work, two locations for the plant are chosen: the first option is the “original” one in Porto 
Marghera (VE), and the second option is in Priolo Gargallo (SR). 
The next step is the application of DyPASI technique, but before analysing the possible NaTech 
scenarios, it’s important to study the vulnerability of the plant site. 
The vulnerability of an area is the propensity to be subjected to damages by a specific 
phenomenon; it represents the lack of resilience or, in other words, the capability to absorb 
impacts and contrast adverse events. 
4.2.1 Porto Marghera vulnerability 
The green refinery is located in the industrial site of Porto Marghera and the surrounding urban 
area are: Mestre at 3 km, Marghera at 2.6 km and Venice at 4 km. 
So, the green refinery is placed closed to urbanized areas and to Venice that is Unesco heritage. 
Furthermore, there is another element that has to be taken into account: the vulnerability related 
to adverse natural events. These aspects are significant to understand the territorial vulnerability 
in which the green refinery have to work and so the absolute importance of an adequate and 
complete risk assessment and management.  
The first natural phenomenon considered to evaluate the vulnerability of the site is the 
earthquake. According to the last seismic classification of the Civil Protection (2015), Venice 
is classified with the fourth level and so with the lowest probability of occurrence of earthquake, 
as can be shown in the Figure 4.4. 
Figure 4.4. Seismic classification (2015) of the North-Italy. 
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Nevertheless, it’s important to observe that several earthquakes, as that of the 20th May 2012 in 
Emilia, cause enormous consequences even though classified with low seismic level (in the 
example of Emilia the region was classified as level three); moreover, heavy consequences can 
be caused by a seismic activity that has the epicentre in another region but with a magnitude 
that is too high. 
Other natural events are rainfall and tornado that are considered in the report of Veneto regional 
council (2012). The report is focused especially on these events due to the several disasters 
caused by the flood rain in 2010. In the last years, it is highly discussed about the “flash-flood” 
or in other words, high intensity rainfall with following storms that cannot be prevented with 
current meteorological and hydrological models and that could be a consequence of the global 
warming. In fact, if on one hand there is a decreasing of the annual and winter rainfall, on the 
other hand it’s possible to observe the above-mentioned “flash-flood” events or rather intensive 
rainfall in the hot semester of the year (May-October). Adopting the CI (a normalized 
concentration index), that estimates the concentration of the daily rainfall, it’s possible to 
observe in Figure 4.5 how this index is increased in the last 20 years and how its territorial 
distribution is changed; it’s clear to understand that in Porto Marghera site there is an increasing 
of the intensity of rainfall.  
Figure 4.5. Change in the CI value from 1970-1989 to 1990-2009 period. 
About Marghera in particular, in Figure 4.6 it is possible to show the special rainfall of the 26th 
September 2007 in Mestre and Marghera, when the total precipitation in 12 hours was ~260 
mm. 
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Figure 4.6. Special rainfall in Mestre and Marghera in the 26th September 2007. 
If the classification of the daily precipitation adopted by Veneto is taken into account, it’s 
possible to conclude that the special event of the 26th September 2007 falls into the extreme 
class (it’s the class 5 and considers a precipitation > 70 mm/day); these and other events 
demonstrate that extreme rainfalls are becoming quite likely. This information is important to 
evaluate the reliability or not of NaTech caused by heavy rain and that can have negative effects 
for the green refinery.  Even tornado and downburst (storm wind) are increasing (in Veneto and 
especially near Porto Marghera area) as can be demonstrated by some episodes as the downburst 
in Mestre in 15th June 2007 that caused 30 injured.  It’s important to underline that these and 
the rainfall considerations would require more data estimated in a long period of time; so, it’s 
not scientifically exact to draw conclusions on these few data but, to achieve the aims of the 
topic, they can be sufficient. 
It’s also important to underline that Veneto is one of the region more affected by lightning as 
it’s shown in Figure 4.7, where is estimated a frequency of occurrence greater than 4/ (km2∙ 
year) as defined by the CEI 81.8. 
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Figure 4.7. Italian area classification of lightning activity. 
This is another natural event that causes several NaTech all around the world. It’s possible to 
observe in the Figure 4.8 and 4.9, reported by Necci Amos (2015), the number of accidents for 
plant and equipment type. 
Figure 4.8. Industrial activities involved in lightning-triggered accidents. 
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Figure 4.9. Equipment categories involved in Natech accidents due to lightning. 
It’s clear to understand that petrochemical and oil & gas plants are the most vulnerable while 
the most damaged equipment type is the storage tank.  
The final natural phenomenon that is analysed is the high tide with possible following floods.  
This type of event is neglected from this analysis because of the position of the green refinery; 
in fact, the site isn’t affected by flood due to the high tide as is possible to demonstrate with the 
absence of consequences in the case of the extraordinary event of the November 1966, when a 
level of +194 cm was reached. 
4.2.2 Priolo Gargallo vulnerability 
It’s then considered the location of the plant in Priolo (SR), a town in Sicily. This choice is not 
casual: the natural conformation of the place, with a large gulf perfect for a harbour, was chosen 
in 1949 for one of the biggest industrial district of Italy. What was not taken into account is the 
seismic danger of the area. This risk has two components: the first one is due to the collision 
between the Euro Asiatic and the African plaques (the so called “faglia dello Stretto” and “Ibleo 
Maltese”), the second is the presence of Mount Etna, the major active volcano in Italy. This 
combination of factor originates one of the highest seismic risk area of Italy. In Figure 4.10 it’s 
shown the seismic classification of the Civil Protection (2015) of Sicily. 
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Figure 4.10. Seismic classification (2015) of Sicily. 
According to this classification, the area of Priolo Gargallo is classified as level 2A. 
Regarding Mount Etna, it’s about 90 km far from Priolo Gargallo, so there aren’t problems with 
lava flow during eruptions but there could be problems with ash fallout. 
Volcanic ashes are small magma particles, of less than 2 mm in diameter, which are emitted 
into the atmosphere, cooled and consolidated, during an eruption. They are composed mainly 
of silicates and therefore are extremely abrasive. Volcanic ashes are particularly insidious due 
to the difficulty to be seen. In fact, in case of cloud cover, dark night, or simply when dilute (eg 
at a certain distance from the point of emission), they are hardly distinguishable from the normal 
atmospheric clouds. Since volcanic ash can also cause extreme danger to aircraft, abrasion to 
the fuselage and engine failure, the Civil Protection Department, with the National Authority 
for Civil Aviation - ENAC, the National Assistance Flight Board - ENAV, the Italian Air Force 
and the National Institute of Geophysics and Volcanology – INGV, has developed procedures 
looking to provide daily maps of areas potentially affected by the scattering of ashes, and to 
allow, in case of eruption, the immediate warning of air traffic controllers. Based on these daily 
procedures, prediction of wind fields for the next 48 hours is given to INGV in Catania and 
then INGV inserts the data into mathematical models of forecasting simulation taking into 
account the characteristics of a typical column of Etna ash: height, mass and volume erupted, 
temperature, particle size, etc.., forecasting and process maps.  
INGV publishes these maps in its website so it’s possible to check if the area of Priolo Gargallo 
is interested in ash fallout or not. 
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In Figure 4.11a it’s shown the deposit load of ashes when Etna isn’t in activity, while in Figure 
4.11b it’s shown the deposit load of ashes during an eruption of Etna. It’s clear that the deposit 
load of ashes in Priolo is low, so this feature will not be taken into account as possible risk. 
Figure 4.11a. Deposit load of volcanic ashes without eruption of Etna. 
Figure 4.11b. Deposit load of volcanic ashes with eruption of Etna. 
Another important natural event is rainfall, but precipitations in Sicily are low. In the report of 
2008 of Hydrologic Risk of Sicily, it’s written that precipitations levels are within some ranges 
(around 1100 mm per year in the mountains areas and around 500 mm per year in the coastal 
areas) and they can be seen in Figure 4.12.  
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Figure 4.12. Mean of total annual precipitations in Sicily. 
Furthermore, Sicily becomes more arid every year, as can be seen in Figure 4.13.  
The different colours of Figure 4.13 are defined by the Crowther index, that is calculated as: 
𝐼𝐶 = 𝑃 − 3,3 ∙ 𝑇 
where P is the total annual precipitation (in cm) and T is the temperature (in °C). 
Figure 4.13. Desertification of Sicily and legend of the Crowther index. 
43 
 
 
Finally, regarding the lightning activity, it can be seen in Figure 4.7 that Sicily, in opposition 
of Veneto, is one of the region less affected by lightning. 
4.3 Application of the DyPASI analysis 
As explained in Chapter 3, the DyPASI analysis is composed by five steps: 
0) Bow-tie analysis 
1) Retrieval of risk notions 
2) Prioritization 
3) Atypical scenarios identification 
4) Definition of safety measures 
At this point all the information are available, thus the analysis can be started. 
4.3.1 Bow-tie analysis 
It’s given the bow-tie for the green diesel release and it’s shown in Figure 4.14. 
Figure 4.14. Bow-tie for the top event green diesel release. 
The basic events (BEs) are two: 
-  the human error, due to the absence of action to change the tank after the signals indication 
of high level; 
-  the failure of equipment and controls, as the level indicator (LI, identification number not 
available) that causes the PFA. 
The critical event (CE) has as unique direct consequence: the diffusion of liquid green diesel. 
Because it is supposed the elimination of ignition sources for the presence of ATEX areas where 
the S-111 is located, it’s supposed the absence of ignition; the E-3 is only the green diesel 
spillage that can cause an environmental contamination of water and soil (water contamination 
can cause damages for the aquatic belief system). 
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4.3.2 Retrieval of risk notions 
In this step, it’s performed a search to find out undetected potential hazards that were ignored 
in conventional bow-tie development.  
Some search systems are used to fulfil the research and are listed in the Table 4.1.  It is 
impossible to use other important database as FACTS (Failure and Accidents Technical 
information System) and IChemE (Institution of Chemical Engineers) because, even if 
information of quality is present in their sites, they are not available in the open free version. 
Table 4.1. Search systems used for the retrieval of risk notions step. 
Search system Information type 
eNATECH  
(Natural hazard-triggered technological accidents) 
NaTech accident database 
ARIA  
(Lessons learnt from industrial accidents) 
Database opened by the French Ministry of Ecology,  
Sustainable Development and Energy 
JST 
Failure Knowledge Database 
Open reference sources on accidents and failures in  
science and technology field 
 
It’s necessary to highlight a limitation in the research using eNATECH, whose aim is to 
systematically collect worldwide Natech accidents and allow the searching and analysis of 
Natech accident reports for lessons-learning purposes. Since it’s a new database, in fact it’s 
opened after recent major natural disasters (such as the 2002 summer floods in Europe or 
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita in the United States in 2005), data of several accidents are not still 
published in the web-site, so the research is necessarily limited to the information with available 
data. In Tables 4.2 and 4.3 the research results about Natech events are reported, in particular 
in Table 4.2 there are accidents due to earthquakes, while in Table 4.3 accidents due to heavy 
rainfalls and lightning are listed. In the Tables, it’s specified the location of the accident (the 
name of the company - when known -, the city and the nation), when it happens (day, month 
and year), some details about the accident (such as the causes, the sequence of events and the 
consequences) and the database from which the accident is found. 
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Table 4.2. Research results about Natech events (earthquakes). 
Location Date Accident details Database 
Refinery of Showa 
Oil Co. - Niigata, 
Japan 
16/06/1964 
An earthquake (magnitude 7.5) caused 
the fire of five crude oil storage tanks: 
the cause of the fire was ignition by 
sparks generated by the collision of the 
floating roof with the side wall, which in 
turn was caused by the movement of the 
crude oil by the sloshing phenomenon. 
The fire also spread to two spherical 
tanks for LPG resulted in the splitting and 
buckling of a supporting leg. No injured, 
286 houses were destroyed by the fire. 
JST 
(EARTHQUAKE) 
Refinery - Sendai, 
Miyagi, Japan 
12/06/1978 
An earthquake (magnitude 7.4) damaged 
seriously three storage tanks containing 
fuel oil. A crack was generated in the 
annular plate of a tank, the oil flowed 
out, washed away the foundation in 
front of a crack, and the crack expanded. 
Age deterioration of the annular plate 
was also one of causes. Environmental 
impacts: 68100 kL of fuel oil in the tank 
flowed out into the sea. 
JST 
(EARTHQUAKE) 
TUPRAS Izmit 
Refinery - Kocaeli, 
Turkey 
 
17/08/1999 
 
An earthquake (magnitude 7.4) ignited 
the naphtha in a naphtha tank farm 
because of the bouncing of the floating 
roof against the inner side of the tanks. 
No injured but economic losses. 
eNATECH 
(EARTHQUAKE) 
Refinery -
Tomakomai, 
Hokkaido, Japan 
 
26/09/2003 
An earthquake (magnitude 8) caused 
damages at the floating roof of a 
naphtha tank; the roof sank, naphtha 
floated above the roof and ignited. 
Environmental impacts, physical 
discomforts accused by several people 
and economic losses. 
JST 
(EARTHQUAKE) 
Cosmo oil 
Refinery -Tohoku, 
Japan 
 
11/03/2011 
An earthquake (magnitude 9) caused 
damages on the LPG tank legs that 
provoked the LPG tank collapse and LPG 
pipes severing and leakage; there were 
fire and explosion. 
There were several injured, a little 
environmental impact for and economic 
losses. 
eNATECH 
(EARTHQUAKE) 
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Table 4.3. Research results about Natech events (heavy rainfalls and 
lightning). 
Location Date Accident details Database 
Refinery -
Kurashiki, 
Okayama, Japan 
17/10/1987 
Due to a heavy rainfall, which continued 
for more than 1 hour 30 minutes, the 
floating roof sank into the naphtha. A 
large amount of rainwater remained on 
the roof because the roof drain sump 
mouth was blocked with dust. Water got 
into two pontoons because someone 
forgot to close the cap of the nozzle for 
airtight tests of the pontoon. An 
abnormal load was put on the roof and it 
sank into the naphtha. 
JST 
(HEAVY  
RAINFALL) 
Pertamina Cilacap  
Refinery -
Indonesia 
 
24/10/1995 
A lightning struck the automatic gauge 
device of an oil tank with a consequential 
sparks production (for poor 
equipotentiality) and oil ignition; the 
burning liquid ran over other naphtha 
tanks (domino effect). No injured but 
economic losses. 
eNATECH 
(LIGHTNING) 
Refinery -
Kawasaki, 
Kanagawa, Japan 
30/09/1998 
A large amount of rainwater fell into a 
high-temperature flange due to the 
failure of heat insulation causing a 
contraction of the material; hydrogen 
and gas oil mist leaked and ignited. Few 
economic losses. 
JST 
(HEAVY 
RAINFALL) 
Samir  
Mohammedia  
Refinery -Morocco 
25/11/2002 
The large amount of rainwater caused 
the collapse of a storage tank roof with 
gas, vapour and oil releases that were 
ignited and then deflagrated. There were 
several fatalities and injured, economic 
losses and also community disruption. 
eNATECH 
(HEAVY  
RAINFALL) 
Refinery - Feyzin,  
France 
17/09/2011 
A lightning struck a water tank contained 
some hydrocarbon amounts and caused 
the tank ignition and the opening along 
the weakest weld. Environmental 
contamination. 
ARIA 
(LIGHTNING) 
 
Tables 4.2 and 4.3 are reports of the collected events for which there were enough data, for 
example, regarding earthquakes, in the eNATECH database there is a list of events, but data 
have not been published yet. 
4.3.3 Prioritization 
With the previous step, several data and information are obtained, thus, to go further, it’s 
important to understand whether the data are significant enough to trigger further action and 
proceed with the process of risk assessment. As a support of this process of prioritization (step 
2 of DyPASI application), a register collecting the risk notions obtained from the retrieval 
process and showing their relative relevance and impact can be obtained. Possible consequences 
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can be determined based on the risk notions and ranked by means of the following scale of 
severity levels (as defined in Chapter 3): 1-Near miss, 2-Mishap, 3-Incident, 4-Accident, 5-
Disaster. 
Adopting this classification, in Tables 4.4 and 4.5 the events above-mentioned in Table 4.2 and 
4.3 are listed on the base of cause typology and prioritized. 
Table 4.4. Prioritization of collected data from the research of Table 4.2. 
Cause and event 
typology 
Date Consequences Severity 
Natech 
(Earthquake) 
16/06/1964 
- scenario: fire (unknown type) and liquefaction of 
the ground 
- casualties: no 
- community disruption: 286 of house was 
destructed by fire 
- environmental impact: unknown 
- economic losses: unknown 
MISHAP 
NaTech 
(Earthquake) 
12/06/1978 
- scenario: outflow of all fuel oil from a tank 
- casualties: no 
- community disruption: unknown 
- environmental impact: 68100 kL of fuel oil flowed 
into the sea 
- economic losses: unknown 
INCIDENT 
NaTech 
(Earthquake) 
17/08/1999 
- scenario: pool fire 
- casualties: no 
- community disruption: industrial areas, residential 
areas, commercial areas, public areas, 
infrastructure. Train services connecting Ankara 
and Istanbul were disrupted because of the fire 
- environmental impact: large quantities of oily 
water flooded the wastewater treatment plant, 
and subsequently flowed into the Izmit Bay 
- economic losses: 57800 thousand USD 
INCIDENT 
NaTech 
(Earthquake) 
26/09/2003 
- scenario: fire (unknown type, maybe jet fire) 
- casualties: no 
- community disruption: people physical discomfort 
- environmental impact: high concentration of 
carcinogenic substances 
- economic losses: shut down for 43 hours and 
81393 thousand USD 
INCIDENT 
NaTech 
(Earthquake) 
11/03/2011 
- scenario: fireball and UVCE/VCE 
- casualties: 6 injured (1 major injured) 
- community disruption: contamination of water by 
material (was recovered but more data are not 
available) 
- environmental impact: high concentration of 
carcinogenic substances 
- economic losses: heavy damages in-site and out-
site the refinery 
ACCIDENT 
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Table 4.5. Prioritization of collected data from the research of Table 4.3. 
Cause and event 
typology 
Date Consequences Severity 
NaTech 
(Heavy Rainfall) 
17/10/1987 
- scenario: rupture of a floating roof tank and release 
of naphtha 
- casualties: no 
- community disruption: no 
- environmental impact: no 
- economic losses: unknown 
NEAR MISS 
NaTech 
(Lightning) 
24/10/1995 
- scenario: tank fire and explosion (unknown type) 
- scenario: pool fire as domino effect (the liquid 
naphtha spread fire to other 6 tanks) 
- casualties: no 
- community disruption: damages to residential 
areas 
- environment impact: contamination of water 
bodies 
- economic losses: yes, for business interruption 
INCIDENT 
NaTech 
(Heavy Rainfall) 
30/09/1998 
- scenario: fire (unknown type, maybe a jet fire) 
- casualties: no 
- community disruption: no 
- environmental impact: no 
- economic losses: yes, of minor entity 
MISHAP 
NaTech 
(Heavy Rainfall) 
25/11/2002 
- scenario: vapour release, fire and explosion 
(UVCE/VCE) 
- casualties: 2 fatalities and 4 injured 
- community disruption: yes, for the necessity to buy 
fuels from international markets 
- environmental impact: no 
- economic losses: damages for 200000 thousand 
USD and shut down of the plant for 9-13 months 
DISASTER 
NaTech 
(Lightning) 
19/07/2011 
- scenario: tank fire 
- casualties: no 
- community disruption: unknown 
- environment impact: Rhone river canal 
contamination with foam 
- economic losses: unknown  
MISHAP 
 
For the evaluation of the events severity, there are several events that can fall in more than one 
category: in these cases, it is given more importance to the human health (if there are or not 
casualties), then the environment damages are considered (possible water, air and soil 
contamination) and only as last aspect the economic and property costs are taken into account. 
4.3.4. Atypical scenarios identification 
The third step is focused on the identification of atypical scenarios. As described in Chapter 3, 
the identification has a qualitative approach, based on the historical analysis on past events, but 
it’s possible to have no consequences for the low amount of the released substance or for other 
reasons. Nevertheless, it’s equally important to identify atypical scenarios previously neglected 
to evaluate them and conclude that they can be ignored only after their examination. The 
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procedure suggested by DyPASI is the Why Tree technique. The first thing to do is to identify 
the BE, the CE and the OE within the potential atypical scenario. Then, starting from OE and 
going backward through CE until BE, the other elements are defined asking questions, such as 
"why?". The integration of the atypical scenario pattern should be performed considering one 
half of the diagram at a time. 
The top event is the green diesel release due to an overflow from the storage S-111. 
At this point it’s necessary to update the bow-tie for Porto Marghera plant and for Priolo 
Gargallo plant separately, according to the different vulnerability of the areas. 
4.3.4.1. Porto Marghera bow-tie 
First, it's considered the left side of the bow-tie diagram and it's possible to identify a new BE: 
the NaTech. Due to the NaTech events, in Porto Marghera plant two Intermediate Events (IE-
1s) are defined: the earthquake and the heavy rainfall. For the former, IE-2 and IE-3 are the 
mechanical stress and then the collapse of the equipment. In fact, considering the event 
happened the 26th September 2003 reported in Table 4.2, the sinking of the roof could cause the 
green diesel release; for the latter, IE-2 and IE-3 are the insufficient mechanical properties of 
the tank and the consequent collapse of the storage tank. In fact, according to the event in Table 
4.3 dated 25th November 2002, the storage tank roof collapsed due to the large amount of 
rainwater. 
At this point, it's necessary to consider the other half part of the bow-tie diagram. Adopting the 
classical procedure, no ignition is considered due to the presence of ATEX areas where the S-
111 is located. But, considering the data obtained in the previous steps it's possible to build a 
new event tree because of atypical ignition sources: 
• the lightning strike is one of the most likely ignition sources, as shown in Figures 4.7 
and 4.8 and also reported in Table 4.3 with the events happened in the 24th October 1995 
and the 17th September 2011; 
• the earthquake (already identified as intermediate event in the left half of the bow-tie) 
can be also the cause of the flammable substances ignition due to the bouncing of the 
floating roof against the inner side of the tank, as described in Table 4.2 with the past 
events dated 16th June 1964 and 17th August 1999. 
So, the modified event tree is shown in Figure 4.12, where the probability of occurrence was 
calculated in a previous work. 
The continuous liquid release of green diesel has as more likely scenario the spillage (that is 
indeed the unique scenario identified with the conventional hazard identification procedure). In 
addition, there are other three scenarios: a pool fire, a flash fire and a UVCE/VCE. 
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Figure 4.12. Modified event tree. 
Now, it's possible to draw the integrated bow-tie, considering the modifications (drawn in blue) 
to both parts of the diagram and it’s shown in Figure 4.13a and 4.13b. 
Figure 4.13a. Graphic representation of the left-hand bow-tie of the plant located in Porto 
Marghera. 
Figure 4.13b. Graphic representation of the right-hand bow-tie of the plant located in Porto 
Marghera. 
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4.3.4.2. Priolo Gargallo bow-tie 
Even in this case it’s considered first the left part of the bow-tie and the new BE is the NaTech. 
Due to the NaTech events, in Priolo Gargallo plant the Intermediate Event (IE) is the earthquake 
and IE-2 and IE-3 are, as for Porto Marghera plant, the mechanical stress and then the collapse 
of the equipment, considering, as before, the event happened the 26th September 2003 reported 
in Table 4.2 (sinking of the roof that could cause the green diesel release). 
Regarding the right part of the bow-tie, since it’s possible to identify an atypical ignition source, 
that is the earthquake, the event tree is modified as in the previous paragraph (Figure 4.12). In 
fact, as reported in Table 4.2, earthquake could be the cause of the ignition of flammable 
substances due to the bouncing of the floating roof against the inner side of the tank (events 
dated 16th June 1964 and 17th August 1999). In Figure 4.14a and 4.14b there are the left hand 
and right hand, respectively, of the bow-tie of the plant located in Priolo Gargallo. 
 
Figure 4.14a. Graphic representation of the left-hand bow-tie of the plant located in Priolo 
Gargallo. 
Figure 4.14b. Graphic representation of the right-hand bow-tie of the plant located in Priolo 
Gargallo.
  
  
Chapter 5 
Fault tree analysis: procedure and 
numerics 
In the previous chapter, the bow-ties, for the cases of the plant located in Porto Marghera and 
in Priolo Gargallo, were updated considering also the NaTech events. The following step is the 
Quantitative Risk Assessment in order to obtain the final frequency of the top event.  
In this chapter, the procedure application is explained and part of the Matlab code used to 
perform the calculation is shown. 
5.1 Probabilistic approach 
As stated in Paragraph 3.3, the Quantitative Risk Assessment is a deterministic approach that 
allows to estimate the failure frequency values, once the potentially hazardous events are 
identified. But, considering also the seismic risk, the deterministic approach often leads to an 
overestimation of the risk. So, a risk assessment that comprehend both mechanical and seismic 
risk has to be written using the probabilistic approach. Whereas for a simple chemical risk 
assessment based on mechanical failure the deterministic model fits well, in a seismic analysis, 
which is based on the probability of the PGA to exceed the seismic capacity of a tank, only a 
probabilistic model can generate a good report. 
5.2 Data conversion 
The chosen method is the probabilistic one but failure frequencies are presented as numbers 
and not with their probabilistic distribution. 
In order to use failure frequency in the system, it is important to convert these values properly. 
The values that need to be transformed are the mechanical failure frequency and the frequency 
associated to heavy rainfalls, since they are expressed in a deterministic way. The overflow of 
the green diesel has a frequency of 3,573*10-6 events/year, this number is extracted by the Eni 
N.A.R. report (2013). While the failure frequency related to heavy rainfalls is about 0,2353 
events/year. This value has been calculated from a report of Veneto regional council (2012), in 
which there is a list of the worst climatic events. 
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Thus, these events are characterized by a constant failure rate λ and the probability distribution 
to be used is the exponential one.  
The probability density function of the exponential distribution is expressed by Equation (5.1): 
𝑓(𝑡) = 𝜆𝑒−𝜆𝑡                                                           (5.1) 
The exponential distribution is frequently used in reliability and safety studies. The distribution 
is characterized by a constant failure rate and a constant mean time to failure. Another 
characteristic of the exponential distribution is that the probability of failure in the interval (t, 
t+∆t) is the same as the probability of failure in any interval of the same length, given that no 
failure has occurred up to time t. 
5.3 Procedure application 
The first step of the probabilistic fault tree analysis is the identification of the fault tree logic 
scheme, which was developed in Chapter 4 for the cases of the plant located in Porto Marghera 
and in Priolo Gargallo. In Figure 5.1 there are the two fault trees. 
a)                                                                                     b) 
Figure 5.1. Part a) is the fault tree of the plant located in Priolo, while part b) is the fault 
tree of the plant located in Porto Marghera. 
The seismic hazard curve, for both cases (Porto Marghera and Priolo Gargallo), is retrieved 
from the Italian Institute of Geophysics and Volcanology (INGV) with reference to the 10% in 
50 years PGA hazard map.  
Data collected from INGV are presented in paragraph 5.3.1 and 5.3.2. 
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5.3.1 Porto Marghera 
In Figure 5.2 it’s shown the map of the area of Porto Marghera in terms of possible values of 
PGA. 
Figure 5.2. Seismic map of Porto Marghera. Possible PGAs in case of earthquake are 
represented in coloured squares. On the right, the legend presents the scale: the area is 
subject to earthquake with PGAs from 0.05g to 0.100g. 
With this map, the INGV gives also a table concerning the probability of a seismic event, sorted 
by the distance and the magnitude. The values are reported in Table 5.1. 
With this table, it’s possible to note the couples of M (magnitude) and R (distance) values 
representative of the earthquake mostly contributing to the seismic hazard of the site of interest. 
In this case, the tank is influenced by earthquakes with epicentre between 30 and 170 km far 
from its location. These earthquakes have magnitude that can vary from the fourth and the 
seventh degree of the Richter’s scale. 
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Table 5.1. Probabilities of an earthquake in Porto Marghera, sorted by 
magnitude in Richter scale (in the columns) and distance (in the rows) from 
the epicentre. The value of these quantities is the mean of border values of the 
interval. 
distance (km) 
Magnitude 
4,25 4,75 5,25 5,75 6,25 6,75 
35 2,11 7,13 8,28 7,44 5,36 0,796 
45 1,05 4,88 6,89 7,13 5,82 0,932 
55 0,116 2,13 4,24 5,15 4,79 0,826 
65 0 0,61 2,43 3,55 3,73 0,69 
75 0 0,066 0,965 1,81 2,17 0,428 
85 0 0 0,352 1,03 1,28 0,263 
95 0 0 0,119 0,671 0,866 0,183 
105 0 0 0,026 0,51 0,824 0,188 
115 0 0 0 0,3 0,636 0,154 
125 0 0 0 0,129 0,403 0,104 
135 0 0 0 0,041 0,218 0,061 
145 0 0 0 0,007 0,075 0,023 
155 0 0 0 0 0,011 0,003 
165 0 0 0 0 0,002 0 
 
A last consideration for seismic risk is the presence of a frequency factor: it represents the 
frequency of return of an earthquake with a chosen magnitude. The calculation of this vector 
can be performed using the Equation (5.1): 
𝑓𝑚 =
10(𝑎−𝑏𝑀)
50
                                                          (5.1) 
This equation highlights the frequency dependence upon three parameters: a and b are constants 
derived by seismic analysis of the area, while M represents the magnitude of the earthquake as 
in Table 5.1. It is worth to be noticed the parameter 1/50: it represents the return period 
considered by INGV in the calculation of the earthquake matrix. 
In order to obtain parameters a and b, it’s necessary to look at the map of the seismogenic 
zonation of Italy, that it’s shown in Figure 5.3, and identify the area in which the plant is located. 
Once the area is selected, there’s a table in which it’s possible to choose b parameter, while the 
parameter a is fixed and it’s equal to 4,76 per each area, except in zone ZS 936 (Etna), where a 
is equal to 4,30.  
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Figure 5.3. Seismogenic zonation of Italy (ZS9), for frequency calculation. 
As can be seen in Figure 5.3, Porto Marghera isn’t identified by a specific area, for this reason 
the calculation of the frequency is achieved using the parameters of the following areas: Friuli 
– Veneto orientale (905), Garda – Veronese (906) and Dorsale Ferrarese (912) that are the 
closest to the point of interest. Then, in the next calculations, only the maximum and minimum 
frequencies will be considered. 
In Table 5.2 there are the results of the calculation of the frequency per each area considered. 
Table 5.2. Frequency vector with the parameter of the three areas (Friuli, 
Garda and Dorsale Ferrarese). 
  Magnitude 
  4,25 4,75 5,25 5,75 6,25 6,75 
ZS b Frequency 
905 1,06 0,035977 0,010617689 0,003134 0,000925 0,000273 8,05E-05 
906 1,14 0,016445 0,004426189 0,001191 0,000321 8,63E-05 2,32E-05 
912 1,35 0,002106 0,000445174 9,41E-05 1,99E-05 4,2E-06 8,88E-07 
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Looking at Table 5.2, it’s possible to highlight that the area with the maximum frequency is the 
Friuli one, while Dorsale Ferrarese has the minimum frequency. Thus, calculations will be 
performed with these two frequencies. 
5.3.2 Priolo Gargallo 
Figure 5.4 represents the map of the area of Priolo Gargallo in terms of possible values of PGA. 
Figure 5.4. Seismic map of Priolo Gargallo. Possible PGAs in case of earthquake are 
represented in coloured squares. On the right, the legend presents the scale: the area is 
subject to earthquake with PGAs from 0.150g to 0.300g. 
It’s possible to see that this area has a seismic risk that is much higher than the previous case. 
Table 5.3 collects the probability of a seismic event, sorted by the distance and the magnitude. 
Table 5.3. Probabilities of an earthquake in Priolo Gargallo, sorted by 
magnitude in Richter scale (in the columns) and distance (in the rows) from 
the epicentre. The value of these quantities is the mean of border values of the 
interval. 
distance (km) 
Magnitude 
4,25 4,75 5,25 5,75 6,25 6,75 7,25 7,75 
5 3,58 11,4 13,5 13,4 11,2 8,03 5,08 0,726 
15 0,037 0,579 1,92 3,67 5,16 5,76 5,25 0,912 
25 0 0 0,036 0,448 1,24 2,12 2,74 0,578 
35 0 0 0 0,01 0,21 0,605 1,04 0,253 
45 0 0 0 0 0,011 0,112 0,266 0,073 
55 0 0 0 0 0 0,014 0,062 0,019 
65 0 0 0 0 0 0 0,006 0,002 
75 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0,001 
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The magnitude interval in this case comprehend also earthquake of the seventh degree of 
Richter’s scale with peak of eighth. These huge earthquakes can be perceived from 80 km away 
from the epicentre. Compared with the previous case, the seismic risk associated with Priolo is 
much higher. 
Regarding the frequency calculation, Priolo is situated in the area 935 of the map of Figure 5.2, 
and has the following parameters used in Equation (5.1): 
• a=4,76; 
• b=0,72. 
The resulting vector is reported in Table 5.4. 
Table 5.4. Frequency vector of earthquake for Priolo (SR) sorted by 
magnitude. 
Magnitude 4,25 4,75 5,25 5,75 6,25 6,75 7,25 7,75 
Frequency 1,002374 0,437552 0,190999 0,083374 0,036394 0,015887 0,006935 0,003027 
 
5.3.3 GMPE and fragility functions 
For each earthquake scenario characterized by a specific magnitude M, epicentre distance R 
and percent contribution to the seismic hazard of the site of interest, the PGA probability density 
function is derived using an updated version of the Sabetta and Pugliese of 1996 (SP96) that is 
the mostly used empirical Ground Motion Prediction Equation (GMPE) for Italy. 
The SP96 functional form for PGA and PGV is defined in Equation (5.2): 
log10 𝑦 = 𝑎 + 𝑏𝑀 + 𝑐 log10 √𝑅2 + ℎ2 + 𝑒𝑖𝑆𝑖                                (5.2) 
Where y is the response variable (maximum between horizontal components), M is the 
magnitude and R is either the epicentral or the Joyner-Boore distance in [km]; the PGA is 
measured in [cm/s2] and the PGV in [cm/s]. Variables Si are dummy variables which assume 
the 0/1 value depending on the site class (rock: S0=1 and S1=S2=0; shallow alluvium: S1=1 and 
S0=S2=0; deep alluvium: S2=1 and S0 =S1=0). 
Concerning the variable Si, in both cases, of the plant located in Porto Marghera and in Priolo 
Gargallo, the site class chosen is the deep alluvium. 
In Table 5.5 there are the values of the parameters that have been corrected from the SP96. 
Table 5.5. Values of the parameters of the GMPE. 
Parameter a b c h e0 e1 e2 σ 
PGA 1,344 0,328 -1,09 5 0 0,262 0,096 0,32 
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Once disaggregated seismic hazard, the following step is the assessment of probabilities of 
detecting a certain damage state: in this thesis, the fragility functions for atmospheric steel tanks 
proposed by Salzano et al. (2003) and collected in Tables 1.2 and 1.3 were adopted for 
characterizing seismic vulnerability of the tank under analysis. 
5.4 Numerics 
The procedure described in the previous paragraph is developed in a Matlab code, in order to 
simulate all the possible PGAs in a seismic zone and to calculate as precisely as possible the 
value of the risk. 
The program is formed by sections regarding the calculation of different aspects of the risk and 
then the last section that resume all risks using the fault tree analysis. 
5.4.1 Seismic failure 
The first section of the code concerns about the calculation of seismic risk. In order to resume 
how the calculation is performed, a part of the program is reported below. 
 
R=xlsread('DistribuzioniPriolo.xlsx', 'distanza', 'A1:A8'); 
M=xlsread('DistribuzioniPriolo.xlsx', 'Magnitudo', 'A1:H1'); 
MP=xlsread('DistribuzioniPriolo.xlsx', 'matrice', 'A1:H8'); 
F=xlsread('DistribuzioniPriolo.xlsx', 'Frequenza', 'A1:H1'); 
  
r=length(R); 
m=length(M); 
logPGA=[]; 
for i=1:r 
    for j=1:m 
        logPGA(i,j)=1.344+0.328*M(j)-1.09*log10(sqrt(R(i)^2+5^2))+0.096; 
    end 
end 
  
sigma=0.32;  
mu2=0.3;  
sigma2=0.6; 
mu3=1.25;  
sigma3=0.65; 
PeqRS1=[]; 
PeqRS2=[]; 
PeqRS3=[]; 
PeqRS1=zeros(rand,1); 
PeqRS2=zeros(rand,1); 
PeqRS3=zeros(rand,1); 
  
for i=1:rand 
    PGA1=random ('norm',logPGA,sigma); 
    PGA=(10.^PGA1)*9.81/100; 
    RS3eq= cdf('logn',PGA,mu3,sigma3); 
    RS2eq=cdf('logn',PGA,mu2,sigma2); 
    Prs1=(1-RS2eq).*(MP./100); 
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    Prs2=(RS2eq-RS3eq).*(MP./100); 
    Prs3=RS3eq.*(MP./100); 
    PfRS11=sum(Prs1).*F; 
    PfRS1=sum(PfRS11(:)); 
    PfRS22=sum(Prs2).*F; 
    PfRS2=sum(PfRS22(:)); 
    PfRS33=sum(Prs3).*F; 
    PfRS3=sum(PfRS33(:)); 
    PeqRS1(i)=[PfRS1 ]; 
    PeqRS2(i)=[PfRS2 ]; 
    PeqRS3(i)=[PfRS3 ]; 
    i=i+1; 
end 
  
PeqRS =[PeqRS1 PeqRS2 PeqRS3]; 
 
The first part uses data by the INGV, these values were collected in an Excel file divided in 
distances, magnitudes (both of them using the mean value of the interval considerate), 
frequencies and the matrix of possible probabilities. 
Using a random value of distance and magnitude, it is possible to simulate an earthquake with 
a defined PGA, calculated and expressed in this case in logarithmic scale with the updated 
SP96. The next step concerns the calculation of the lognormal distribution of PGAs, before risk 
calculation.  
It is important to know that there are three possibilities for a seismic impact in a plant, divided 
by the dimension of the leakage. To obtain a precise representation, all possibilities have to be 
examined.  
Next step defines three vectors, one for each failure severity.  Then, calculating the cumulative 
distribution function using lognormal and parameters, it is possible to achieve a result expressed 
by a matrix of seismic risk. 
5.4.2 Mechanical failure 
The second section of the code concerns about the calculation of mechanical failure. Part of the 
program is reported below. 
 
lambda=3.573E-6;  
time=50;  
t=[0:0.1:time]; 
f=lambda*exp(-lambda.*time); 
X=[]; 
 
for i=1:rand 
    X(i)=random ('exp',f); 
    RS(i)=X(i); 
end 
 
RS=RS'; 
PmRS=RS; 
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As said in Par 5.2, since it’s given only a deterministic value of the failure frequency, it’s used 
the exponential distribution to convert this value. Then, random values of the probability 
distribution function are generated. Here it’s considered only one value of the release state, in 
such way it’s avoided to count twice the division of the release states done by LNE Department, 
since the final function is obtained multiplying the seismic risk matrix with the mechanical 
failure probability. 
5.4.3 Heavy rainfall failure 
This section, concerning the calculation of the probability of failure due to heavy rainfalls, it’s 
only present in the code of the atmospheric steel tank located in Porto Marghera, as a result of 
the vulnerability analysis done in Paragraph 4.2.1. As in the case of the mechanical components 
failure, there is only a value of the failure frequency. Thus, it’s used the exponential distribution 
to convert the value and below part of the program is shown. 
 
lambda_rain=0.2353;  
time=50;  
f_rain=lambda_rain*exp(-lambda_rain.*time); 
X_rain=[]; 
 
for i=1:rand 
    X_rain(i)=random ('exp',f_rain); 
     RS1_rain(i) =  X_rain(i).*0.84; 
     RS2_rain(i) =  X_rain(i).*0.08; 
     RS3_rain(i) =  X_rain(i).*0.08; 
end 
 
RS1_rain=RS1_rain'; 
RS2_rain=RS2_rain'; 
RS3_rain=RS3_rain'; 
 
PmRS1_rain=RS1_rain; 
PmRS2_rain=RS2_rain; 
PmRS3_rain=RS3_rain; 
 
PmRS_rain =[PmRS1_rain PmRS2_rain PmRS3_rain]; 
 
As it can be seen, this part of the code is similar to the part of the mechanical failure. But in this 
case, it’s considered the division of the three possible release states according to LNE 
Department, since this part is connected with an OR operator to the seismic failure probability. 
5.4.4 Combination of risks 
Finally, the last part is about the combination of the risks calculated in the previous sections 
according to the fault tree scheme adopted. As it can be seen in Figure 5.1, the case of the plant 
located in Priolo Gargallo expect an AND operator between the seismic failure and the 
mechanical one in the fault tree, so the aggregation of the two contributions is obtained by a 
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multiplication. The calculation of the top event probability to verify in the case of the tank 
located in Priolo Gargallo is reported below. 
 
PRS1=PeqRS1.*PmRS; 
PRS2=PeqRS2.*PmRS; 
PRS3=PeqRS3.*PmRS; 
P=[PRS1 PRS2 PRS3]; 
 
While, in the case of the plant located in Porto Marghera, the fault tree scheme expects an OR 
operator between the seismic failure and the heavy rainfall one, and then an AND operator with 
the mechanical failure. The calculation of the top event probability in the case of the tank 
located in Porto Marghera is as follow. 
 
PRS1=(PeqRS1+PmRS1_rain).*PmRS; 
PRS2=(PeqRS2+PmRS2_rain).*PmRS; 
PRS3=(PeqRS3+PmRS3_rain).*PmRS; 
P=[PRS1 PRS2 PRS3]; 
 
In both cases the three contribution of the possible release states are computed in separate 
equations and then resumed in a vector. 
A total number of 10000 simulations were performed with the aim of stochastically taking into 
account all the potential combinations of probability values. 
It’s worth to be noticed that in this Chapter only some parts of the code are shown and that the 
parameters values displayed are used as example, but they change in the different case studies. 
The complete code is attached in the Appendix.
  
  
Chapter 6 
Results presentation 
The results obtained in the two case studies highlight how the location of the industrial storage 
tanks influences the risk: in this Chapter, it’s shown how the seismic failure probability 
distributions are higher in Priolo than in Porto Marghera. 
In each location, two calculations are performed: one is the case of the unanchored tank and the 
other is the case of the anchored tank. 
6.1 Mechanical components failure probability 
The first result presented is the mechanical components failure probability distribution, since 
it’s the same for each of the case studies, since its deterministic value is taken from the Eni 
N.A.R. report and it’s then converted with an exponential distribution function. 
Figure 6.1 shows the mechanical failure probability distribution. 
Figure 6.1. Probability distribution related to mechanical components failure. On the x-axis 
the values of probability distribution are reported, while on the y-axis the probability of a 
result to verify. 
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As stated in Paragraph 5.4.2, in the case of the mechanical components failure, the division of 
the LNE Department is not taken into account to avoid the double counting in the top-event 
probability distribution. Thus, Figure 6.1 illustrates only one probability distribution curve. It’s 
possible to see that release state probability values, concerning only mechanical components 
failure, are very low, in fact they range from 10-5 to 10-4. 
6.2 Tank located in Priolo Gargallo 
In the first case study, the atmospheric steel tank is located in Priolo Gargallo. 
6.2.1 Unanchored tank 
Figure 6.2 shows the seismic failure probability distribution of the area for the unanchored tank; 
green corresponds to earthquake slightly affecting the structure of the tank, thus a negligible 
loss of containment occurs (RS1), yellow represents a structural damage of the shell, thus giving 
rise to “slight loss of content” (RS2), while red represent a consistent and rapid loss of content, 
thus a catastrophic damage of the tank (RS3). 
Figure 6.2. RS1, RS2 and RS3 probability distributions related to failure induced by 
earthquake scenario occurrences. On the x-axis the values of probability distribution are 
reported, while on the y-axis the probability of a result to verify. 
With reference to only earthquake-induced failures, quite high release states probability values 
are observed, ranging from 10-3 to 10-1, and the reason is the high seismicity of the area. Looking 
at Figure 6.2 it’s possible to check if the probability of a light damage of the tank is higher than 
the one of a medium or heavy one. Figure 6.2 highlights that lower probabilities are associated 
67 
 
 
to lower release states (as RS1), whereas higher probability values characterize more critical 
release states (e.g. RS3). 
Finally, Figure 6.3 represents the results obtained from the aggregation of the classical 
mechanical failures and the damages induced by earthquake occurrence. In this specific case 
study, it’s possible to see how the low values of probability of mechanical failure influence the 
final probability values, since in the fault tree scheme there’s the AND operator that expects 
the multiplication between the values. 
 Figure 6.3. RS1, RS2 and RS3 aggregated probability distributions of top-event occurrence. 
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6.2.2 Anchored tank 
Figure 6.4 shows the seismic failure probability of the area for the anchored tank; as in the 
previous case, green expresses the probability of a small damage (RS1), yellow a medium 
leakage (RS2) and red the rapid total loss of containment (RS3). 
Figure 6.4. RS1, RS2 and RS3 probability distributions related to failure induced by 
earthquake scenario occurrences. On the x-axis the values of probability distribution are 
reported, while on the y-axis the probability of a result to verify. 
Finally, Figure 6.5 represents the results obtained from the aggregation of the classical 
mechanical failures and the damages induced by earthquake occurrence. 
Figure 6.5. RS1, RS2 and RS3 aggregated probability distributions of top-event occurrence. 
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Also in this case, as in the previous one, the low values of probability of mechanical failure 
influence the final probability values, because of the AND operator in the fault tree scheme. 
 
Now it’s possible to compare the results obtained in the case of the unanchored tank with the 
one of the anchored tank. Before running the simulations in Matlab, the expected result was 
that the probability of failure due to an earthquake of the anchored tank should have been lower 
than the one of an unanchored tank. But looking at Figures 6.2 and 6.4 it’s possible to see that 
failure probabilities are very similar in the case of medium damage (RS2) and higher for the 
catastrophic damage (RS3) in the case of the anchored tank. Concerning this topic, further 
considerations will be done at the end of the Chapter. 
6.3 Tank located in Porto Marghera 
The second case study concerns the atmospheric steel tank located in Porto Marghera. In this 
situation, the calculations relating to the failure probability induced by earthquake scenario 
occurrence are performed twice: in the case of maximum frequency of return of an earthquake 
and in case of minimum frequency. These two conditions are represented by Friuli area and 
Dorsale Ferrarese one, respectively. 
6.3.1 Unanchored tank 
Figure 6.6a) represents the probability distributions of the different release states related to 
seismic failure for the unanchored tank in the case of maximum frequency of return of an 
earthquake. 
Figure 6.6a) and 6.6b). RS1, RS2 and RS3 probability distributions related to failure 
induced by earthquake scenario occurrences. Part a) is calculated with maximum values of 
the frequency, while part b) with the minimum ones. On the x-axis the values of probability 
distribution are reported, while on the y-axis the probability of a result to verify. 
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On the other hand, Figure 6.6b) represents the probability distributions of the different release 
states related to seismic failure for the unanchored tank in the case of minimum frequency of 
return of an earthquake. Comparing Figure 6.6a) and 6.6b), it’s possible to see that the two 
situations differ of one order of magnitude in the case of RS1 andRS3, and even of two orders 
of magnitude in the case of RS2. 
Figure 6.7 shows the probability distributions of the three possible release states in the case of 
failure induced by heavy rainfall scenario occurrences. Also in the situation of heavy rainfall 
failure distributions are divided in three levels: green expresses the probability of a small 
damage (RS1), yellow a medium one (RS2) and red the rapid total loss of containment (RS3). 
 
Figure 6.7. RS1, RS2 and RS3 probability distributions related to failure induced by heavy 
rainfall scenario occurrences. On the x-axis the values of probability distribution are 
reported, while on the y-axis the probability of a result to verify. 
Regarding only heavy rainfall-induced failures, low release states probability values are 
observed (Figure 6.7), ranging from 10-6 to 10-5. Higher probability values are related to lower 
release states whereas lower probabilities are associated to more risky release states. 
In Figures 6.8a) and 6.8b) there are the aggregated probability distributions of top-event 
occurrence, calculated with the maximum and minimum frequency of return of an earthquake 
respectively. Also in Figures 6.8a) and 6.8b), as in the case of Figures 6.6a) and 6.6b), it’s 
possible to see that comparing the two situations there is an order of magnitude of difference. 
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Figure 6.8a) and 6.8b). RS1, RS2 and RS3 aggregated probability distributions of top-event 
occurrence. Part a) is calculated with maximum values of the frequency of return of an 
earthquake, while part b) with the minimum ones. 
6.3.2 Anchored tank 
Figure 6.9a) represents the probability distributions of the different release states related to 
seismic failure for the anchored tank in the case of maximum frequency of return of an 
earthquake. While Figure 6.9b) represents the probability distributions of the different release 
states related to seismic failure for the anchored tank in the case of minimum frequency of 
return of an earthquake. 
Figure 6.9a) and 6.9b). RS1, RS2 and RS3 probability distributions related to failure 
induced by earthquake scenario occurrences. Part a) is calculated with maximum values of 
the frequency, while part b) with the minimum ones. On the x-axis the values of probability 
distribution are reported, while on the y-axis the probability of a result to verify. 
It’s clear also in this situation that there’s an order of magnitude between the case of maximum 
frequency and the case of minimum frequency. 
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Figure 6.10 shows the probability distributions of the three possible release states in the case of 
failure induced by heavy rainfall scenario occurrences. 
Figure 6.10. RS1, RS2 and RS3 probability distributions related to failure induced by heavy 
rainfall scenario occurrences. On the x-axis the values of probability distribution are 
reported, while on the y-axis the probability of a result to verify. 
As in the case of the unanchored tank, in the case of heavy rainfall-induced failures, low release 
states probability values are observed (Figure 6.10), ranging from 10-6 to 10-5. Higher 
probability values are related to lower release states whereas lower probabilities are associated 
to more risky release states. 
In Figures 6.11a) and 6.11b) there are the aggregated probabilities of top-event occurrence, 
calculated with the maximum and minimum frequency of return of an earthquake respectively. 
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Figure 6.11a) and 6.11b). RS1, RS2 and RS3 aggregated probabilities of top-event 
occurrence. Part a) is calculated with maximum values of the frequency of return of an 
earthquake, while part b) with the minimum ones.
  
  
 
Conclusions 
The aim of this work was to evaluate the risk for an atmospheric steel tank taking into account 
also natural events. 
The first problem that arose was that conventional risk assessment wasn’t able to consider also 
the Na-Tech accidents. For this reason, new techniques were introduced: DyPASI approach and 
probabilistic fault tree analysis. 
The application of DyPASI entails a systematic screening process that, based on early warnings 
and risk notions, should be able to identify possible Atypical Scenarios available at the time of 
the analysis. It’s composed by several steps and the final result is an updated bow-tie that 
consider also the Na-Tech. 
Once the updated bow-tie was available, the probabilistic fault tree analysis was applied. 
The main problem that arose at this point was how to combine deterministic values derived by 
mechanical risk assessment and probabilistic distribution of earthquakes. The main assumption 
was to transform mechanical values in a probabilistic way. Since only a value of mechanical 
failure frequency was present, an exponential distribution function was used. This choice was 
made because failure frequencies are derived by a structural analysis with a well-established 
procedure. Years of accidental data collection and innovation gave reliable results. On the other 
hand, in terms of seismic analysis, data are derived by historical series. These studies analyse 
all earthquakes with quantitative instrumental data starting only one hundred years ago, so they 
are based on few events. Their values are more general.  
Thanks to this method the risk became a product of single contribution that can be analysed 
using a Matlab code specially developed.  
First of all, it was important to study seismic data of the two locations chosen: Porto Marghera 
(VE) and Priolo Gargallo (SR). In the first case, it was found that the risk associated to seismic 
events had a low value; in Priolo the seismic risk is one of the highest of Italy. But Porto 
Marghera is surrounded by locations that are submitted to a high seismic risk. This fact results 
in the possibility that also far earthquakes can have consequences on this site.  In both locations, 
simulations are performed for anchored and unanchored tank. 
In the case of Porto Marghera, it was considered also the failure probability due to heavy 
rainfall, as a result of the vulnerability analysis of the area. 
The designed code multiplied results of the seismic analysis with the one of the mechanical 
failure probability in the case of Priolo Gargallo. On the other hand, in the case of Porto 
Marghera, results of seismic analysis and of rainfall analysis was summed and then the result 
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was multiplied with the one of mechanical failure probability. A distribution curve of 
frequencies is obtained. The result expresses the probability of a top-event in each case studies. 
Differences in the seismic failure probability distributions between Priolo and Porto Marghera 
are very high and they reflect the dissimilar seismicity of the two areas. In fact, as a result of 
the vulnerability analysis of the two locations it’s evident that Priolo is a highly seismic area 
and on the other hand, Porto Marghera is not. 
Comparing the cases of the unanchored tank with those of the anchored tank, the expected 
results are not confirmed; conversely, they highlight that failure probabilities are higher in the 
case of the anchored tank. Thus, in future studies, it’s better to consider seismic insulation 
systems, as the one shown in Figure below, at least in seismic zones. 
Figure. Example of seismic insulation system. 
Results have highlighted how taking into account earthquake occurrence is a crucial step in 
defining release occurrence probabilities in areas prone to seismic hazard. 
When dealing with seismic risk, a probabilistic approach might thus be preferred due to 
significant uncertainties that are involved in the analysis.  
In this thesis, it’s used a method to extend probabilistic approaches also to the classic QRA 
analysis with the aim to formalize a probabilistic fault tree analysis to be performed when 
seismic risk has to be faced. In this way, a combination of natural risk and chemical one is 
possible.
  
Appendix 
Matlab codes 
A. Unanchored tank in Priolo Gargallo 
rand=input('number of iterations') 
  
  
% Earthquake 
  
R=xlsread('DistribuzioniPriolo.xlsx', 'distanza', 'A1:A8'); 
M=xlsread('DistribuzioniPriolo.xlsx', 'Magnitudo', 'A1:H1'); 
MP=xlsread('DistribuzioniPriolo.xlsx', 'matrice', 'A1:H8'); 
F=xlsread('DistribuzioniPriolo.xlsx', 'Frequenza', 'A1:H1'); 
  
r=length(R); 
m=length(M); 
logPGA=[]; 
for i=1:r 
    for j=1:m 
        logPGA(i,j)=1.344+0.328*M(j)-1.09*log10(sqrt(R(i)^2+5^2))+0.096; 
    end 
end 
  
sigma=0.32; % Shape value of LogPGA 
mu2=0.15; % Mean value of Fragility Medium hole 
sigma2=0.7; % shape value of Fragility Medium hole 
mu3=1.06; % Mean value of Fragility large hole 
sigma3=0.8;  % Shape value of Fragility large hole 
PeqRS1=[]; 
PeqRS2=[]; 
PeqRS3=[]; 
PeqRS1=zeros(rand,1); 
PeqRS2=zeros(rand,1); 
PeqRS3=zeros(rand,1); 
  
for i=1:rand 
%     PGA1=10.^(logPGA+sigma); 
    PGA1=random ('norm',logPGA,sigma); 
    PGA=(10.^PGA1)*9.81/100; 
    RS3eq= cdf('logn',PGA,mu3,sigma3); 
    RS2eq=cdf('logn',PGA,mu2,sigma2); 
    Prs1=(1-RS2eq).*(MP./100); 
    Prs2=(RS2eq-RS3eq).*(MP./100); 
    Prs3=RS3eq.*(MP./100); 
    PfRS11=sum(Prs1).*F; 
    PfRS1=sum(PfRS11(:)); 
    PfRS22=sum(Prs2).*F; 
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    PfRS2=sum(PfRS22(:)); 
    PfRS33=sum(Prs3).*F; 
    PfRS3=sum(PfRS33(:)); 
    PeqRS1(i)=[PfRS1 ]; 
    PeqRS2(i)=[PfRS2 ]; 
    PeqRS3(i)=[PfRS3 ]; 
    i=i+1; 
end 
  
PeqRS =[PeqRS1 PeqRS2 PeqRS3]; 
meaneq=mean(PeqRS); 
  
 
[countsa,centersa] = hist(PeqRS1,20); 
[countsb,centersb] = hist(PeqRS2,20); 
[countsc,centersc] = hist(PeqRS3,20); 
[countspga,centerspga] = hist(PGA1,20); 
  
ya=linspace(0,(max(countsa/rand)+0.05)); 
yb=linspace(0,(max(countsb/rand)+0.05)); 
yc=linspace(0,(max(countsc/rand)+0.05)); 
  
  
figure (1) 
bar(centerspga,(countspga/rand),'g'); 
  
  
figure (2) 
subplot(3,1,1) 
bar(centersa,(countsa/rand),'g'); 
title ('Earthquake Probability') 
% axis([0 0.25 0 inf]) 
 
subplot(3,1,2) 
bar(centersb,(countsb/rand),'y') 
% axis([0 0.25 0 inf]) 
 
subplot(3,1,3) 
bar(centersc,(countsc/rand),'r') 
% axis([0 0.25 0 inf]) 
 
 
% Failure rate of mechanical components 
 
lambda=3.573E-6; %event/years 
time=50; %years 
t=[0:0.1:time]; 
f=lambda*exp(-lambda.*time); 
X=[]; 
for i=1:rand 
    X(i)=random ('exp',f); 
    RS(i)=X(i); 
end 
RS=RS'; 
 
PmRS=RS; 
  
79 
 
 
[countsd,centersd] = hist(PmRS,20); 
 
yd=linspace(0,(max(countsd/rand)+0.05),100); 
 
figure (3) 
% subplot(3,1,1) 
bar(centersd,(countsd/rand),'y'); 
title ('Failure Probability of Mechanical Components ') 
 
% Probability of release from atmospheric tank 
 
PRS1=PeqRS1.*PmRS; 
PRS2=PeqRS2.*PmRS; 
PRS3=PeqRS3.*PmRS; 
P=[PRS1 PRS2 PRS3]; 
meanP=mean(P);  
 
[counts1,centers1] = hist(PRS1,20); 
[counts2,centers2] = hist(PRS2,20); 
[counts3,centers3] = hist(PRS3,20); 
  
y1=linspace(0,(max(counts1/rand)+0.05),100); 
y2=linspace(0,(max(counts2/rand)+0.05),100); 
y3=linspace(0,(max(counts3/rand)+0.05),100); 
  
figure (4) 
  
subplot(3,1,1) 
bar(centers1,(counts1/rand),'g') 
title ('Probability of top-event') 
subplot(3,1,2) 
bar(centers2,(counts2/rand),'y') 
subplot(3,1,3) 
bar(centers3,(counts3/rand),'r') 
B. Anchored tank in Priolo Gargallo 
rand=input('number of iterations') 
  
  
% Earthquake 
 
R=xlsread('DistribuzioniPriolo.xlsx', 'distanza', 'A1:A8'); 
M=xlsread('DistribuzioniPriolo.xlsx', 'Magnitudo', 'A1:H1'); 
MP=xlsread('DistribuzioniPriolo.xlsx', 'matrice', 'A1:H8'); 
F=xlsread('DistribuzioniPriolo.xlsx', 'Frequenza', 'A1:H1'); 
  
r=length(R); 
m=length(M); 
logPGA=[]; 
for i=1:r 
    for j=1:m 
        logPGA(i,j)=1.344+0.328*M(j)-1.09*log10(sqrt(R(i)^2+5^2))+0.096; 
    end 
end 
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sigma=0.32; % % Shape value of LogPGA 
mu2=0.3; % Mean value of Fragility Medium hole 
sigma2=0.6; % shape value of Fragility Medium hole 
mu3=1.25; % Mean value of Fragility large hole 
sigma3=0.65;  % Shape value of Fragility large hole 
PeqRS1=[]; 
PeqRS2=[]; 
PeqRS3=[]; 
PeqRS1=zeros(rand,1); 
PeqRS2=zeros(rand,1); 
PeqRS3=zeros(rand,1); 
  
for i=1:rand 
%     PGA1=10.^(logPGA+sigma); 
    PGA1=random ('norm',logPGA,sigma); 
    PGA=(10.^PGA1)*9.81/100; 
    RS3eq= cdf('logn',PGA,mu3,sigma3); 
    RS2eq=cdf('logn',PGA,mu2,sigma2); 
    Prs1=(1-RS2eq).*(MP./100); 
    Prs2=(RS2eq-RS3eq).*(MP./100); 
    Prs3=RS3eq.*(MP./100); 
    PfRS11=sum(Prs1).*F; 
    PfRS1=sum(PfRS11(:)); 
    PfRS22=sum(Prs2).*F; 
    PfRS2=sum(PfRS22(:)); 
    PfRS33=sum(Prs3).*F; 
    PfRS3=sum(PfRS33(:)); 
    PeqRS1(i)=[PfRS1 ]; 
    PeqRS2(i)=[PfRS2 ]; 
    PeqRS3(i)=[PfRS3 ]; 
    i=i+1; 
end 
  
PeqRS =[PeqRS1 PeqRS2 PeqRS3]; 
meaneq=mean(PeqRS); 
  
[countsa,centersa] = hist(PeqRS1,20); 
[countsb,centersb] = hist(PeqRS2,20); 
[countsc,centersc] = hist(PeqRS3,20); 
[countspga,centerspga] = hist(PGA1,20); 
  
ya=linspace(0,(max(countsa/rand)+0.05)); 
yb=linspace(0,(max(countsb/rand)+0.05)); 
yc=linspace(0,(max(countsc/rand)+0.05)); 
  
  
figure (1) 
bar(centerspga,(countspga/rand),'g'); 
  
  
figure (2) 
subplot(3,1,1) 
bar(centersa,(countsa/rand),'g'); 
title ('Earthquake Probability') 
% axis([0 0.25 0 inf]) 
 
subplot(3,1,2) 
bar(centersb,(countsb/rand),'y') 
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% axis([0 0.25 0 inf]) 
 
subplot(3,1,3) 
bar(centersc,(countsc/rand),'r') 
% axis([0 0.25 0 inf]) 
 
  
% Failure rate of mechanical components 
 
lambda=3.573E-6; %event/years 
time=50; %years 
t=[0:0.1:time]; 
f=lambda*exp(-lambda.*time); 
X=[]; 
for i=1:rand 
    X(i)=random ('exp',f); 
    RS(i)=X(i); 
end 
RS=RS'; 
 
PmRS=RS;  
 
[countsd,centersd] = hist(PmRS,20); 
 
yd=linspace(0,(max(countsd/rand)+0.05),100); 
 
figure (3) 
% subplot(3,1,1) 
bar(centersd,(countsd/rand),'y'); 
title ('Failure Probability of Mechanical Components ') 
 
  
% Probability of release from atmospheric tank 
 
PRS1=PeqRS1.*PmRS; 
PRS2=PeqRS2.*PmRS; 
PRS3=PeqRS3.*PmRS; 
P=[PRS1 PRS2 PRS3]; 
meanP=mean(P); 
 
[counts1,centers1] = hist(PRS1,20); 
[counts2,centers2] = hist(PRS2,20); 
[counts3,centers3] = hist(PRS3,20); 
  
y1=linspace(0,(max(counts1/rand)+0.05),100); 
y2=linspace(0,(max(counts2/rand)+0.05),100); 
y3=linspace(0,(max(counts3/rand)+0.05),100); 
  
figure (4) 
  
subplot(3,1,1) 
bar(centers1,(counts1/rand),'g') 
title ('Probability of top-event') 
subplot(3,1,2) 
bar(centers2,(counts2/rand),'y') 
subplot(3,1,3) 
bar(centers3,(counts3/rand),'r') 
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C. Unanchored tank in Porto Marghera 
rand=input('number of iterations') 
  
  
% Earthquake 
 
R=xlsread('DistribuzioniPortoMarghera.xlsx', 'distanza', 'A1:A14'); 
M=xlsread('DistribuzioniPortoMarghera.xlsx', 'Magnitudo', 'A1:F1'); 
MP=xlsread('DistribuzioniPortoMarghera.xlsx', 'matrice', 'A1:F14'); 
F=xlsread('DistribuzioniPortoMarghera.xlsx', 'Frequenza', 'A1:F1'); 
  
r=length(R); 
m=length(M); 
logPGA=[]; 
for i=1:r 
    for j=1:m 
        logPGA(i,j)=1.344+0.328*M(j)-1.09*log10(sqrt(R(i)^2+5^2))+0.096; 
    end 
end 
  
sigma=0.32; % Shape value of LogPGA 
mu2=0.15; % Mean value of Fragility Medium hole 
sigma2=0.7; % shape value of Fragility Medium hole 
mu3=1.06; % Mean value of Fragility large hole 
sigma3=0.8;  % Shape value of Fragility large hole 
PeqRS1=[]; 
PeqRS2=[]; 
PeqRS3=[]; 
PeqRS1=zeros(rand,1); 
PeqRS2=zeros(rand,1); 
PeqRS3=zeros(rand,1); 
  
for i=1:rand 
%     PGA1=10.^(logPGA+sigma); 
    PGA1=random ('norm',logPGA,sigma); 
    PGA=(10.^PGA1).*9.81/100; 
    RS3eq= cdf('logn',PGA,mu3,sigma3); 
    RS2eq=cdf('logn',PGA,mu2,sigma2); 
    Prs1=(1-RS2eq).*(MP./100); 
    Prs2=(RS2eq-RS3eq).*(MP./100); 
    Prs3=RS3eq.*(MP./100); 
    PfRS11=sum(Prs1).*F; 
    PfRS1=sum(PfRS11(:)); 
    PfRS22=sum(Prs2).*F; 
    PfRS2=sum(PfRS22(:)); 
    PfRS33=sum(Prs3).*F; 
    PfRS3=sum(PfRS33(:)); 
    PeqRS1(i)=[PfRS1 ]; 
    PeqRS2(i)=[PfRS2 ]; 
    PeqRS3(i)=[PfRS3 ]; 
    i=i+1; 
end 
  
PeqRS =[PeqRS1 PeqRS2 PeqRS3]; 
meaneq=mean(PeqRS); 
  
 
[countsa,centersa] = hist(PeqRS1,20); 
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[countsb,centersb] = hist(PeqRS2,20); 
[countsc,centersc] = hist(PeqRS3,20); 
[countspga,centerspga] = hist(PGA1,20); 
  
ya=linspace(0,(max(countsa/rand)+0.05)); 
yb=linspace(0,(max(countsb/rand)+0.05)); 
yc=linspace(0,(max(countsc/rand)+0.05)); 
  
  
figure (1) 
bar(centerspga,(countspga/rand),'g'); 
  
  
figure (2) 
subplot(3,1,1) 
bar(centersa,(countsa/rand),'g'); 
title ('Earthquake Probability') 
% axis([0 0.25 0 inf]) 
 
subplot(3,1,2) 
bar(centersb,(countsb/rand),'y') 
% axis([0 0.25 0 inf]) 
 
subplot(3,1,3) 
bar(centersc,(countsc/rand),'r') 
% 1axis([0 0.25 0 inf]) 
 
  
% Failure rate of mechanical components 
 
lambda=3.573E-6; %event/years 
time=50; %years 
t=[0:0.1:time]; 
f=lambda*exp(-lambda.*time); 
X=[]; 
for i=1:rand 
    X(i)=random ('exp',f); 
     RS(i) = X(i); 
      
end 
RS=RS'; 
  
  
PmRS=RS; 
  
[countsd,centersd] = hist(PmRS,20); 
 
yd=linspace(0,(max(countsd/rand)+0.05),100); 
 
figure (3) 
  
% subplot(3,1,1) 
bar(centersd,(countsd/rand),'y'); 
title ('Failure Probability of Mechanical Components ') 
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% Heavy rainfall 
 
lambda_rain=4/17; %event/years 
time=50; %years 
f_rain=lambda_rain*exp(-lambda_rain.*time); 
X_rain=[]; 
for i=1:rand 
    X_rain(i)=random ('exp',f_rain); 
     RS1_rain(i) =  X_rain(i).*0.84; 
     RS2_rain(i) =  X_rain(i).*0.08; 
     RS3_rain(i) =  X_rain(i).*0.08; 
end 
RS1_rain=RS1_rain'; 
RS2_rain=RS2_rain'; 
RS3_rain=RS3_rain'; 
  
PmRS1_rain=RS1_rain;  
PmRS2_rain=RS2_rain;  
PmRS3_rain=RS3_rain;  
 
PmRS_rain =[PmRS1_rain PmRS2_rain PmRS3_rain]; 
meanm_rain=mean(PmRS_rain); 
  
[countsd_rain,centersd_rain] = hist(PmRS1_rain,20); 
[countse_rain,centerse_rain] = hist(PmRS2_rain,20); 
[countsf_rain,centersf_rain] = hist(PmRS3_rain,20); 
  
yd_rain=linspace(0,(max(countsd_rain/rand)+0.05),100); 
ye_rain=linspace(0,(max(countse_rain/rand)+0.05),100); 
yf_rain=linspace(0,(max(countsf_rain/rand)+0.05),100); 
  
figure (4) 
  
subplot(3,1,1) 
bar(centersd_rain,(countsd_rain/rand),'g'); 
title ('Heavy Rainfall Probability ') 
subplot(3,1,2) 
bar(centerse_rain,(countse_rain/rand),'y') 
subplot(3,1,3) 
bar(centersf_rain,(countsf_rain/rand),'r') 
 
% Probability of release from atmospheric tank 
 
PRS1=(PeqRS1+PmRS1_rain).*PmRS; 
PRS2=(PeqRS2+PmRS2_rain).*PmRS; 
PRS3=(PeqRS3+PmRS3_rain).*PmRS; 
P=[PRS1 PRS2 PRS3]; 
meanP=mean(P); 
 
[counts1,centers1] = hist(PRS1,20); 
[counts2,centers2] = hist(PRS2,20); 
[counts3,centers3] = hist(PRS3,20); 
  
y1=linspace(0,(max(counts1/rand)+0.05),100); 
y2=linspace(0,(max(counts2/rand)+0.05),100); 
y3=linspace(0,(max(counts3/rand)+0.05),100); 
  
figure (5) 
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subplot(3,1,1) 
bar(centers1,(counts1/rand),'g') 
title ('Probability of top-event') 
 
subplot(3,1,2) 
bar(centers2,(counts2/rand),'y') 
 
subplot(3,1,3) 
bar(centers3,(counts3/rand),'r') 
 
D. Anchored tank in Porto Marghera 
rand=input('number of iterations') 
  
  
% Earthquake 
 
R=xlsread('DistribuzioniPortoMarghera.xlsx', 'distanza', 'A1:A14'); 
M=xlsread('DistribuzioniPortoMarghera.xlsx', 'Magnitudo', 'A1:F1'); 
MP=xlsread('DistribuzioniPortoMarghera.xlsx', 'matrice', 'A1:F14'); 
F=xlsread('DistribuzioniPortoMarghera.xlsx', 'Frequenza', 'A1:F1'); 
  
r=length(R); 
m=length(M); 
logPGA=[]; 
for i=1:r 
    for j=1:m 
        logPGA(i,j)=1.344+0.328*M(j)-1.09*log10(sqrt(R(i)^2+5^2))+0.096; 
    end 
end 
  
sigma=0.32; % Shape value of LogPGA 
mu2=0.3; % Mean value of Fragility Medium hole 
sigma2=0.6; % shape value of Fragility Medium hole 
mu3=1.25; % Mean value of Fragility large hole 
sigma3=0.65;  % Shape value of Fragility large hole 
PeqRS1=[]; 
PeqRS2=[]; 
PeqRS3=[]; 
PeqRS1=zeros(rand,1); 
PeqRS2=zeros(rand,1); 
PeqRS3=zeros(rand,1); 
  
for i=1:rand 
%     PGA1=10.^(logPGA+sigma); 
    PGA1=random ('norm',logPGA,sigma); 
    PGA=(10.^PGA1).*9.81/100; 
    RS3eq= cdf('logn',PGA,mu3,sigma3); 
    RS2eq=cdf('logn',PGA,mu2,sigma2); 
    Prs1=(1-RS2eq).*(MP./100); 
    Prs2=(RS2eq-RS3eq).*(MP./100); 
    Prs3=RS3eq.*(MP./100); 
    PfRS11=sum(Prs1).*F; 
    PfRS1=sum(PfRS11(:)); 
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    PfRS22=sum(Prs2).*F; 
    PfRS2=sum(PfRS22(:)); 
    PfRS33=sum(Prs3).*F; 
    PfRS3=sum(PfRS33(:)); 
    PeqRS1(i)=[PfRS1 ]; 
    PeqRS2(i)=[PfRS2 ]; 
    PeqRS3(i)=[PfRS3 ]; 
    i=i+1; 
end 
  
PeqRS =[PeqRS1 PeqRS2 PeqRS3]; 
meaneq=mean(PeqRS); 
  
 
[countsa,centersa] = hist(PeqRS1,20); 
[countsb,centersb] = hist(PeqRS2,20); 
[countsc,centersc] = hist(PeqRS3,20); 
[countspga,centerspga] = hist(PGA1,20); 
  
ya=linspace(0,(max(countsa/rand)+0.05)); 
yb=linspace(0,(max(countsb/rand)+0.05)); 
yc=linspace(0,(max(countsc/rand)+0.05)); 
  
  
figure (1) 
bar(centerspga,(countspga/rand),'g'); 
  
  
figure (2) 
subplot(3,1,1) 
bar(centersa,(countsa/rand),'g'); 
title ('Earthquake Probability') 
 
subplot(3,1,2) 
bar(centersb,(countsb/rand),'y') 
 
subplot(3,1,3) 
bar(centersc,(countsc/rand),'r') 
 
 
% Failure rate of mechanical components 
 
lambda=3.573E-6; %event/years 
time=50; %years 
t=[0:0.1:time]; 
f=lambda*exp(-lambda.*time); 
X=[]; 
for i=1:rand 
    X(i)=random ('exp',f); 
     RS(i) = X(i); 
     
end 
RS=RS'; 
 
PmRS=RS;  
[countsd,centersd] = hist(PmRS,20); 
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yd=linspace(0,(max(countsd/rand)+0.05),100); 
 
figure (3) 
  
% subplot(3,1,1) 
bar(centersd,(countsd/rand),'y'); 
title ('Failure Probability of Mechanical Components ') 
 
  
% Heavy rainfall 
 
lambda_rain=4/17; %event/years 
time=50; %years 
f_rain=lambda_rain*exp(-lambda_rain.*time); 
 
X_rain=[]; 
for i=1:rand 
    X_rain(i)=random ('exp',f_rain); 
     RS1_rain(i) =  X_rain(i).*0.84; 
     RS2_rain(i) =  X_rain(i).*0.08; 
     RS3_rain(i) =  X_rain(i).*0.08; 
end 
RS1_rain=RS1_rain'; 
RS2_rain=RS2_rain'; 
RS3_rain=RS3_rain'; 
  
PmRS1_rain=RS1_rain;  
PmRS2_rain=RS2_rain;  
PmRS3_rain=RS3_rain;  
  
PmRS_rain =[PmRS1_rain PmRS2_rain PmRS3_rain]; 
meanm_rain=mean(PmRS_rain); 
  
[countsd_rain,centersd_rain] = hist(PmRS1_rain,20); 
[countse_rain,centerse_rain] = hist(PmRS2_rain,20); 
[countsf_rain,centersf_rain] = hist(PmRS3_rain,20); 
  
yd_rain=linspace(0,(max(countsd_rain/rand)+0.05),100); 
ye_rain=linspace(0,(max(countse_rain/rand)+0.05),100); 
yf_rain=linspace(0,(max(countsf_rain/rand)+0.05),100); 
  
figure (4) 
  
subplot(3,1,1) 
bar(centersd_rain,(countsd_rain/rand),'g'); 
title ('Heavy Rainfall Probability ') 
subplot(3,1,2) 
bar(centerse_rain,(countse_rain/rand),'y') 
subplot(3,1,3) 
bar(centersf_rain,(countsf_rain/rand),'r') 
 
 
% Probability of release from atmospheric tank 
 
  
PRS1=(PeqRS1+PmRS1_rain).*PmRS; 
PRS2=(PeqRS2+PmRS2_rain).*PmRS; 
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PRS3=(PeqRS3+PmRS3_rain).*PmRS; 
P=[PRS1 PRS2 PRS3]; 
meanP=mean(P); 
 
[counts1,centers1] = hist(PRS1,20); 
[counts2,centers2] = hist(PRS2,20); 
[counts3,centers3] = hist(PRS3,20); 
  
y1=linspace(0,(max(counts1/rand)+0.05),100); 
y2=linspace(0,(max(counts2/rand)+0.05),100); 
y3=linspace(0,(max(counts3/rand)+0.05),100); 
  
figure (5) 
  
subplot(3,1,1) 
bar(centers1,(counts1/rand),'g') 
title ('Probability of top-event') 
 
subplot(3,1,2) 
bar(centers2,(counts2/rand),'y') 
 
subplot(3,1,3) 
bar(centers3,(counts3/rand),'r') 
 
  
References 
Antonioni G., Bonvicini S., Spadoni G. and Cozzani V. (2009). Development of a framework 
for the risk assessment of Na-Tech accidental events. Reliability Engineering and System 
Safety, 94, 1442-1450. 
Bindi D., Luzi L., Pacor F., Sabetta F. and Massa M. (2009). Towards a new reference ground 
motion prediction equation for Italy: update of the Sabetta-Pugliese (1996). Bull Earthquake 
Eng, 7, 591-608. 
Campedel M., Cozzani V., Krausmann E. and Cruz A. M. (2008). Analysis of Natech Accidents 
recorded in Major Accident Databases. In: Ninth International Probabilistic Safety 
Assessment and Management Conference (Hong Kong, China). 
Cruz A. M., Steinberg L. J., Vetere Arellano A. L., Nordvik J. P. and Pisano F. in the European 
Commission (2004). State of the Art in Natech Risk Management. 
Di Carluccio A. (2007). Structural Characterisation and Seismic Evaluation of Steel 
Equipments in Industrial Plants. PhD Thesis in Seismic Risk, Polo delle Scienze e delle 
Tecnologie, University of Napoli (Federico II). 
Eni N.A.R. Report (2013).  Analisi di Sicurezza a supporto della dichiarazione di Non Aggravio 
di Rischio. 
European Parliament (2012). Directive 2012/18/UE. 
Gnesotto A. (2016). Risk analysis in atmospheric and pressurized tank subjected to seismic 
effects. Master Thesis in Chemical and Process Engineering, DII, University of Padova. 
Jain P., Pasman H. J., Waldram S. P., Rogers W. J. and Mannan M. S. (2016). Did we learn 
about risk control since Seveso? Yes, we surely did, but is it enough? An historical brief and 
problem analysis. Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries. 
Necci Amos (2015). Cascading events triggering industrial accidents: quantitative assessment 
of natech and domino scenarios. PhD Thesis in Environmental and Safety chemical 
engineering, DIPIC, University of Bologna. 
Paltrinieri N., Tugnoli A., Buston J., Wardman M. and Cozzani V. (2013). DyPASI: from 
Information Retrieval to Integration of HAZID Process. Chemical Engineering Transactions, 
32, 433-438. 
Paltrinieri N., Tugnoli A., Buston J., Wardman M. and Cozzani V. (2013). Dynamic Procedure 
for Atypical Scenarios Identification (DyPASI): A new systematic HAZID tool. Journal of 
Loss Prevention in the Process Industries, 26, 683-695. 
Salzano E., Agreda A. G., Di Carluccio A. and Fabbrocino G. (2009). Risk assessment and 
early warning systems for industrial facilities in seismic zones. Reliability Engineering and 
System Safety, 94, 1577-1584. 
90 
 
Salzano E., Iervolino I. and Fabbrocino G. (2003). Seismic risk of atmospheric storage tanks in 
the framework of quantitative risk analysis. Journal of Loss Prevention in the process 
industries, 16, 403-409. 
Schüller J. C. H., Brinkman J.L., Van Gestel P.J. and van Otterloo R.W. (1997). Methods for 
determining and processing probabilities, “Red Book” (2th ed.). 
Sinnott R. and Towler G. (2009). Chemical Engineering Design (5th ed.). Butterworth-
Heinemann, Oxford (UK). 
Veneto regional council (2012).  Eventi Meteorologici Estremi – Dati e valutazioni sulla 
radicalizzazione del clima in Veneto. 
Vianello C., Zanini M. A. and Maschio G. (2016). Probabilistic Fault Tree Analysis of Refinery 
Plant Components subjects to Earthquake Scenarios. Chemical Engineering Transaction, 52. 
 
Web-sites 
http://enatech.jrc.ec.europa.eu/  (last access 19/12/16) 
http://www.ingv.it/it/ (last access 31/03/2017) 
http://www.protezionecivile.gov.it/jcms/it/cen_vulc_rischio.wp (last 
access 31/03/2017) 
http://www.sozogaku.com/fkd/en/ (last access 31/03/2017) 
http://www.aria.developpement-durable.gouv.fr/find-accident/?lang=en 
(last access 31/03/2017) 
https://www.mepa.org.mt/topics-seveso-background (last access 7/11/2016) 
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/seveso/legislation.htm (last access 
7/11/2016) 
 
 
 
